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Introduction
With the development of communications, the appealing
power of trademarks or trade-dresses has become of crucial
importance in today's worldwide economy. Accordingly,
trademark licensing based businesses have dramatically
increased during the last three decades. Because of its
importance, this sector has inevitably attracted the
attention of the antitrust authorities, and has thus given
rise to abundant case law. Based on the analysis of
antitrust tying law, notably in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Kodak, the purpose of this thesis is to
establish patterns as to the validity, under antitrust law,
of x hot' clauses present in medium no long term marketing
programs. The underlying idea is that due to the importance
in terms of investment and duration of trademark licensing
programs, their framers need to be able to back their
drafting work on stable legal standards so as to ensure an
efficient implementation immunized from adverse antitrust
challenges for the time of their duration. The analysis of
the case law will show that current regulation of tie-ins,
especially in view of Kodak, does not provide drafters with
the requisite legal predictability. Nor have commentators or
most practitioners proposed workable alternatives to cop
2with such potentially highly prejudicial antitrust pitfalls.
The proposition of this thesis for reducing legal
uncertainty will therefore be that, in light of the law in
force in the European Union, American Congress should amend
the law to introduce an exemption procedure, whereby
notified agreements could be granted an immunity from
antitrust challenges. Such an amendment would substantially
ease the task of drafters, and most importantly, enhance
American business people competitiveness in the world
marketplace, notably as against their European counterparts.
IBackground on trademark licensing and antitrust
The increasing importance of communicative devices has
come to a point that trademark licensing is today a crucial
component of domestic as well as international trade. Yet,
despite the pro-competitive aspect of trademarks, licensing
programs do not always comply with antitrust regulation.
Consequently, these agreements are subject to increased
antitrust scrutiny.
A Relevance of trademark licensing
Trademark licensing is nowadays an omnipresent
commercial device. Trademarks are of crucial importance in
the communicative-enhanced world. At the same time, the
specificity of licensing as a medium of trade, provides
trademark owners with unique economic as well as legal
benefits. Logically, licenses of trademarks have
dramatically developed for the last thirty years. A
trademark consists of "any word, name symbol, or device or
any combination thereof" 1 used to identify and distinguish
products of one source from another. As far as trademark
licensing is concerned, it is the grant by the trademark
4owner (the licensor), to the producer or supplier of
products or services (the licensee), of the right to use his
mark on, or in connection with the goods or services. Given
this definition, licensing is neither an assignment nor a
distributorship. First of all, though the right to use the
mark may be as extensive or limited as the parties to the
agreement agree", the licensor keeps the ownership of the
trademark. Therefore, a trademark license, as opposed to an
assignment 3 , is the grant of not all but specified rights
related to the brand 4 . Second of all, licensing differs from
distributorship. Both contracts are of the kind a company
enters into with another one, when seeking for external
strategic alliances. Nevertheless, these alliances occur at
a different stage of the economic process. While licensing
arises at the level of manufacturing or marketing,
distributorship comes into play only for the distribution of
retail products or services . Therefore, licensing is a
trade device in which the licensor keeps the ownership of
her property so as to monitor the exploitation of her
trademark, but does not have the charge of the manufacturing
as well as the marketing process leading up to the sale of
the retail branded goods. Because of these specific
characters, licensing appears as a highly attractive
business tool for trademark owners. The sale of WordPerfect
for 1.2 billion dollars, whose revenues come wholly from the
licensing of its copyrights and trademarks , demonstrates
that strategic licenses can make the trademark a valuable
5corporate asset . Indeed, intelligent licensing allows the
trademark holder to capitalize on his property by
strengthening the mark on an economic as well as legal
prospective 8 .
From an economic standpoint, not only does licensing
provide the trademark owner with additional revenues, but it
also contributes to increase the market penetration of her
property along with its popularity 9 . First of all,
competitiveness often requires that a company extend its
outlets so as to reach increased consumer's bases. Or,
because of the globalization of markets along with the
changes in consumers' attitudes 10 , the brand owner is likely
to lack manufacturing capabilities or marketing expertise.
Therefore, adequate licenses enable the company to
efficiently expand its business either geographically or
in scope 1 ' or both so as to increase its competitive
advantage in the marketplace. Second of all, licensing
enhances consumer' s awareness of unique or already well-
known mark. Indeed, the value of a particular trademark lies
in the goodwill 1 ' developed in connection with the branded
goods. And "[g]oodwill is the advantage obtained from the
use of a trademark. This includes public confidence in the
quality of the product and in warranties made on behalf of
the product, and the name recognition of the product by the
public that differentiates that product from others" 1 '1 . Or,
consumer's recognition of the quality standard of particular
goods requires tremendous promotional expenses. For example,
6Philip Morris spends over $ 2 billion annually on
advertising programs to support the continuing recognition
of its portfolio of brand names 15 . In this prospective,
sponsorship of the core trademark by means of its license
for collateral merchandises 1 " acts as a very fruitful
advertising medium . Last but not least, licensing affords
the trademark owner with additional revenues. The agreement
may generates two types of incomes. On the one hand, in
return of the right to use the mark, the licensee undertakes
to pay the licensor royalties 18 . On the other hand, the
license may be the occasion to sell a bundle of associated
products or services to the licensee 19 .
Apart from its economic benefits, licensing is often
necessary to ascertain and enhance the legal protection of
the trademark. In particular, the use perquisite for
trademark protection 20 may make it important for the brand
holder to enter into license agreements. Indeed, only
trademarks which are actually used "in commerce" ' in their
category are afforded efficient protection against
infringement or dilution actions". Therefore, strategic
licenses of the mark legally strengthen it, notably in
secondary product or service lines where the licensor does
not actually exploit the brand, but contemplates to
expand 2 ^. Likewise, in the transnational environment, many
foreign countries require that the mark be used within their
jurisdiction to afford them protection" . License of the
trademark, so as to fulfill the use requirement, is thus
7strategic prior to exportation. Moreover, despite the
increasing regulation with regard to international
protection" , some countries are still reluctant to enforce
or join those multinational conventions 26 . Therefore,
appropriate licensing appears as an alternative to prevent
or terminate infringement actions. In these conditions,
licensing is considered as a very attractive commercial
practice, if not necessary, on the view point of a trademark
holder. This probably explains its dramatic development in
trade
.
While theoretically conceivable in infinite situations,
trademark licensing has mainly developed in three areas 27 .
First, in the 1970' s, trademark license increased together
with the growth in franchising. Then, in the late 1980' s,
licensing of trademarks exploded in merchandising to
represent in 1990 25 billion dollars^ 8 . The new trend is now
towards multi-media projects, where trademark licensing may
appear as a very interesting medium of communication. This
success of trademark licensing is due, in large part, to the
broad protection of symbols as trademarks, including notably
trade dress '
.
With respect to franchising, trademarks are of crucial
importance 30 . As it is for Shell or Mc Donald's, any
franchise system encompasses three elements i . The first,
and core element is the license of the trademark of the
franchisor to the franchisee. Indeed, through the House
mark, consumers are able to recognize the reputation and the
8quality standards of the whole franchise system. Second, the
franchise includes a fee element. Third, to uniformly
connect all the franchisees in consumer' s mind, the system
requires a "marketing plan" for the mark, set up by the
franchisor and to be fulfilled by her franchisees 3z .
Therefore, the license of the mark along with other
materials " is determinative to successful franchising.
As far as merchandising is concerned, the bottom line
of the explosion of trademark licensing lies in the
exploitation of unique or already well-known brands to sell
a wide range of products or services 34 . This is especially
obvious in the entertainment industry, where corporations,
institutions, or celebrities register their names and
likeness as trademarks to license them for collateral
merchandises. Popular names of television programs such as
BEVERLY HILLS 90210 are licensed to various companies for
use on clothing, toys, games, school supplies or mugs . So
do artists 36 , colleges 37 , or sports teams 8 . Merchandising,
through trademark licensing is, therefore, a privileged
medium to capitalize on the popularity of names or logos.
Finally, the growth of trademark licensing is likely to
become even greater in the light of the development of
multi-media projects 39 . Indeed, whatever the media,
trademarks may turn out to be very valuable properties for
two reasons. First, the communicative-enhanced aspect of
colors, logos or moving images is essential to the success
of projects such as interactive games, CD-ROM or the
Internet 4 . Indeed, images facilitate the attraction, and
then the access of consumers to technical products or
services . Retail vendors have understood the marketing
value of visual features or symbols. For instance, Apple
advertised its Macintosh computer by showing display screens
with icon images representing the operating system
function 42 . Hence, creators of valuable symbols seek to
legally protect them notably as trade dress 43 . Second, the
recent position of the courts regarding the copyrightability
of computer software-like products is likely to drive
people towards trademark law. Indeed, the functional
doctrine along with the hardening of the test for
infringement 46 , render copyright protection less and less
available to screen displays. In this context, it is
probable that trademark protection will turn out to be the
appropriate alternative 47 . Therefore, since icons, corporate
names, logos as well as components of software-like products
are emerging as very important trademark properties in the
on-line world, so will surely be trademark licensing . Yet,
the crucial growth of trademark licensing has not gone
alone. The courts along with the authorities have
increasingly focused their concerns on the legal aspects of
trademark licenses. In particular, antitrust laws have
become a central issue when building trademark license
programs
.
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B Interface between trademark and antitrust laws
Trademark licensing is usually viewed as beneficial on
a competition-enhancing stand point. Yet, in some
circumstances it may violate antitrust laws. In particular,
it will be the case when licensing is used as a device to
extend statutory trademark rights. While trademark and
antitrust laws share a common purpose of encouraging
"industry and competition" 49 , they take different paths in
achieving it. Hence, trademark license agreements give rise
to antitrust scrutiny. Both trademark and antitrust laws aim
to foster competition in the marketplace. As far as
trademark protection is concerned, its foremost policy is to
allow a producer to distinguish his goods from those of
others in order to avoid consumer's confusion . The
positive side of this goal is that trademark law enhances
efficient competition among producers or suppliers x . By
protecting distinctive marks 5 , trademark law encourages
trademark owners to invest in advertising campaigns as well
as in elevated quality standards 53 .
With respect to antitrust laws, their overall purpose
is to promote free competition in the marketplace . Over
the years, two major concerns have emerged from the case
law. First, the Supreme Court is concerned, through
antitrust enforcement, to allow free enterprise between
competitors by means of protecting independent businesses
from the overwhelming power of monopolies and cartels 3 . The
second, and predominant goal nowadays , is to promote
11
consumer' s welfare through efficient use and allocation of
resources along with progressiveness 57 . Therefore, trademark
laws share common objectives with antitrust laws: to
encourage efficient competition as well as consumer'
s
welfare. Nevertheless, the two sets of rules take different
steps in achieving these goals. Hence, some conflicts are
inevitable. Historically, antitrust pitfalls in trademark
licensing have arisen principally with respect to market
power and exclusionary conducts. On the one hand, trademark
law may infer some market power thanks to the exclusive
right granted to the trademark holder 58 . On the other hand,
antitrust laws condemn conducts that abuse or extend market
power or which aim to exclude competitors. Consequently, as
noted by Assistant Attorney General, Anne Bingaman, the two
sets of rules must be implemented so as to reach a "balance
between protecting intellectual property to reward
innovation and maintaining competition in markets where
innovation occurs" 59 .
As far as trademark licensing is concerned, it is
generally viewed as pro-competitive . Indeed, licensing can
lead to a more efficient exploitation of the trademark,
which enhances competition, and ultimately benefits to
consumers
01
. From the standpoint of the licensor, it gives
him access to marketing expertise necessary to efficiently
develop the trademark 62 . From the standpoint of the
licensee, licensing provides him with properties he would
not get otherwise 6 ^. Hence, it increases the likelihood of
12
competition in the marketplace. Finally, from the standpoint
of consumers, the license expands the availability of
trademarked products or services. Thus it contributes to
consumer's welfare by enlarging his choices among competing
goods. Yet, despite its pro-competitive aspect, trademark
licensing may give rise to some conflicts with antitrust
laws. Indeed, the bottom line of antitrust challenges to
trademark licensing lies in the use by the licensor of the
leverage of the trademark to seek reward in an area not
covered by the statutory right. Therefore, while drafting
the license agreement, the trademark holder must look very
carefully at antitrust laws to avoid as much as possible
potential exposures to antitrust suits.
Proper enforcement of trademark license programs is
essential to the success of the business of the trademark
holder . However, in doing so, the licensor is likely to
encounter tricky obstacles in the form of antitrust defenses
as well as affirmative claims or counterclaims . First of
all, while suing a licensee for breach of the license
agreement, or any infringer, the licensor may face a defense
of misuse . Trademark misuse constitutes a dangerous threat
upon the licensor's rights. Not only is it widely opened to
defendants , but besides, if successful, it defeats the
claim of the licensor. However, because of the enhanced-
competition aspect of trademark laws , defendants to a
trademark licensing case, can raise an antitrust misuse
defense only in limited situations where the trademark
13
"itself has been the basic and fundamental vehicle required
and used to accomplish the [antitrust] violation" 69 . In
particular, a defense of trademark misuse will dismiss a
claim brought by the mark owner if the latter used his
property in a way that extends trademark protection beyond
its valid scope . A finding of trademark misuse has very
severe effects. Not only does it preclude the enforcement of
the trademark against the defendant, but also against any
other licensee and or infringer 71 . Given that, all the
licensees of the license program may continue to use the
trademark unencumbered by royalty obligations so long as the
misuse is not purged. Purge of antitrust misuse requires
abandonment of the condemned conduct along with dissipation
of its effects . Therefore, trademark misuse is a very
powerful tool available to licensees, which the licensor
must bear in mind while building up his license program.
Second, simultaneously or alternatively , the licensor
may face antitrust affirmative claims or counterclaims, that
will ultimately affect proper enforcement of his license
program 4 . However, to succeed, the antitrust claimant must
not only have standing but also establish the elements of an
antitrust offense. Standing concerns are essential in
antitrust cases. The Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice 75 , the Federal Trade Commission 7 " as well as state
attorneys general 7 ' do not have to meet specific
requirements to challenge an antirust violation. With
respect to private parties, however, standing matters
14
considerably limit their capacity to sue. A trademark
licensing agreement may be challenged either by a licensee,
an infringer, or any competitor of the licensor. Indeed,
section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for a private remedy
for antitrust violations 78 . Yet, the Supreme Court has
narrowly defined the proper private plaintiff in antitrust
cases . Basically, a private party has standing to sue only
if: (1) he was personally injured by the challenged
conduct
, (2) he suffered damages in his business or
properties
, (3) the injury is of a kind to be addressed by
antitrust laws 8 ", and (4) the cause of his injury originates
in the challenged conduct 83 .
Once standing requirements are met, the antitrust
claimant musr. bring evidence of the elements of the
antitrust violation, which originally derived from statutory
law. Among the antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act is the
cornerstone 84 . Whereas section 1 prohibits conducts that
unreasonably restrain competition 85 , section 2 condemns
monopolization 80 . Under this rationale, a diversity of
practices present in trademark licensing are subject to
antitrust violations, notably territorial divisions
,
resale price maintenance 8 , or boycotts . For the purpose of
this thesis, however, we will focus on tying arrangements
present in trademark license programs, and which regulation
under current antitrust laws is somehow unclear, and
therefore, problematic for drafters.
II
Tying arrangements
To understand the rationale underlying tying
arrangements, prior definitions are necessary. In
particular, in trademark licensing, tie-ins may be
explained, in part, by the specific obligations which bear
trademark holders to keep their right over their brands.
A Definitions
A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell
one product only on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees
that he will not purchase that product from any supplier" .
In particular, when it comes to licensing, tying occurs
where the licensor agrees to license an article (the tying
product or service) provided that the licensee undertakes
either to take another item from the licensor , or not to
take it from somebody else 92 . For a better understanding,
tying arrangements must be relocated in the marketing
process of goods. Not only do tie-ins occur in the context
of vertical integration, but they are of the type which
affect the licensee's dealing discretion.
15
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First of all, the nature of the relationship between a
licensor and his licensees is vertical. Efficiency driven 9 ,
vertical relationships can be either integrated or
contractual. Vertical integration occurs when a single
entity deals with the whole chain of activities, starting
from the conception of a product, and leading up to its
final sale to retail customers 94 . Likewise, vertical
contracts serve similar objectives of efficiency 5 . Yet,
they are different since they intervene between two or more
independent entities located at a different step of the
commercialization process. Tying arrangements present in
licensing are of the latter kind 96 . Indeed, they are passed
between the licensor, who initiates a new product or service
line, and the licensee, who markets and distributes the
product. The core character of these agreements is that the
parties do not compete with one another in the market of the
products 97 . For instance, in the franchising context, the
franchisor who licenses her brand for the marketing of ice-
creams, does not market those products herself. Therefore,
she does not compete with her franchisees in the market of
ice-creams 98 . The non-competitive relationship of the
licensor with his licensees makes tying arrangements, where
they occur in licensing, vertical contracts.
Second of all, tying arrangements occur in situations
where the licensor somehow has the power to influence the
licensee's dealing discretion. In this respect, tie-ins
share common characters with refusal to license or exclusive
17
dealing conducts". Yet, unlike a refusal to license, the
primary focus of a tie is not to maintain selected resale
prices 100 . Indeed, a refusal to license often results from
the rebuttal of the licensee to abide by the licensor's
high-price policy . Tie-ins also differ from exclusive
dealings in the sense that the conduct involves not one but
two articles. An exclusive dealing consists of an agreement
in which the licensee or the franchisee agrees not to sell
1 02
or supply other articles than the licensor's ones . Like
tie-ins, exclusive dealings have the effect to limit the
licensee's or franchisee's dealing discretion 103 . However,
unlike tie-ins, an exclusive license deals with only one
market. Therefore, there is something more in tying since it
starts from one market (the tying item), and extends to
another market (the tied item) . It is probably the reason
why, tying arrangements, as vertical restraining agreements,
are subject to a specific scrutiny from the antitrust laws.
Characterization of tie-ins in trademark licensing programs
is thus necessary.
B CHARACTERIZATION OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS IN TRADEMARK LICENSING
Theoretically, a particular trademark can be either the
tying or the tied item in the context of tying
arrangements 104 . For the purpose of this thesis, however, we
will focus on tying provisions present in trademark licenses
when the trademark is the tying element. On this premise,
possible tied items are infinite and depend on the
18
circumstances of the particular license program at issue.
This second element, necessary to characterize the presence
of a tie, can range from the product or service, the mark
represents, to completely unrelated articles.
On the one hand, the license of the mark is often tied
to the sale or supply of the products or services meant to
bear that particular brand. It is especially true in the
franchising industry, whose major purpose is to market the
franchisor's articles 105 . For instance, the lease of BASKIN-
ROBBINS trademark is conditioned to the purchase of ice-
cream products of the same name 106 . Likewise, MERCEDES-BENZ
ties the license of her brand to automobile as well as
replacement parts 107 .
On the other hand, the trademark may be tied to items
not primarily representing the brand. In the franchising
context, to achieve some uniformity among all the
franchisees, the licensor may tie any of the "marketing
plan' s" element to the license of the house mark . For
example, besides the license of the mark, Mc Donald's
corporation used to require his franchisees to lease their
premises from it along with the payment of a 15,000. dollar
security deposit 109 . It argued that controlling the location
of franchisees' implantation was part of its marketing plan
to make Mc Donald's brand attractive 110 . As far as collateral
merchandising is concerned, by definition, the well-known
mark is licensed for the marketing of articles not primarily
related to the significance of the brand 11 ". In this context,
\9
tying may appear, if, for example, the owner of a famous
motion picture registered as a trademark, licenses it for
the marketing of toys provided that the licensee buys the
toys from the licensor or from any designated source that he
controls. Likewise, if a CD ROM or an interactive video game
is produced out of the motion picture, the license of the
trademark will occur in the course of a multi-media project.
In this hypothesis, the mark may be tied up with the
purchase of the material support of the project or some of
its components (disks) . The brand may also be licensed on
the condition that the producer-licensee takes another mark
or the copyright of the motion picture. In this latter case,
the mark will be licensed together with another property
right. The trend is towards this form of license, which is
termed 'package' or 'hybrid' licensing.
In general, package licensing occurs when the trademark
holder licenses her trademark along with another trademark,
a patent, a copyright or a trade secret in a single license
agreement. In the food industry, the licensor-franchisor may
require that his franchisees use a special recipe protected
as a trade secret for the manufacturing of the retail
products. Likewise, in the entertainment industry where
motion pictures are often protected under copyright as well
as trademark law, the licensor may condition the use of the
trademark for merchandises or multi-media projects provided
that the licensee also take the underlying copyright. These
so-called 'hybrid' licenses are a form of tying since the
20
licensee is limited in his choice, he takes either the
package or nothing. These licenses may be very efficient on
the licensor's point of view. Yet, they raise specific legal
issues. Indeed, each intellectual property right is governed
by its own legal regime, which is more or less attractive to
its owner. In this respect, trademarks, if properly used,
are indefinitely protected, whereas patents are protect only
for twenty years. Therefore, tying them together can unable
the licensor to extend the duration of the patent
protection. Likewise, the trademark owner may be willing to
license her portfolio of brand names, more or less
significant in a single package. Or, efficient trademark
protection is afforded only to distinctive marks. Therefore,
the licensor actually has the less significant brand names
benefit from the distinctiveness, and thus attractiveness of
other brands. We see, hybrid license, if forced, gives the
tied intellectual property right an artificial advantage.
Consequently, package licenses are subject to special
antitrust scrutiny, especially when their purpose is to
extend the scope of the tying trademarks. In this respect,
it is interesting to question the expected objectives of the
brand owner for tying her trademark to another item.
C Why tying in trademark licensing
In general, tie-ins conducts can be explained as
devices aimed to achieve economic objectives, which,
21
depending on the circumstances, are viewed as pro or anti-
competitive 112 .
Principally, based on the leverage theory 113 , tying
arrangements are considered as monopoly 114-extension mediums.
Through the leverage of her dominant position gained thanks
to the strength of her intellectual property, the licensor
tends to create a monopolistic position in the tied product
market. It is this function of tie-ins, the courts have
favored for almost a century 115 . Indeed, tying arrangements
based on the exploitation of a patent, a copyright or a
trademark have been widely struck down, considering that
they illegally tend to extend the statutory monopoly
According to this view, not only do these arrangements harm
competitors by raising barriers to their entry into the
second market 11 , but they also harm consumers by allowing
the licensor to make monopolistic profits. Opponents to this
theory are numerous as well as vigorous 118 . Basically, they
rebut the inadequacy of the leverage reasoning . With
respect to competitors, their contention is that tying
arrangements are neutral 1 '' , when they do not favor economic
efficiency 121 . As far as consumer's welfare is concerned,
many commentators think tie-ins are generally beneficial 1 ",
and should be challenged only in the few cases where they
are not 1 " 3 . Therefore, instead of the leverage reasoning,
many commentators believe tie-ins serve other functions,
which, if not pro-competitive, should be analyzed with less
severity
.
22
First of all, tying contracts can be means to evade
price regulation. Indeed, when the price of the tying good
is controlled, tying the sale or lease of the first item to
a second, non-controlled item, allows the seller or licensor
to elude the regulation by setting a single price for the
whole package ' . However, this hypothesis is very unlikely
to be relevant in the trademark licensing context since
trademarks are not subject to price regulations.
Second of all, through price discrimination, tie-ins
can function as a metering device 125 . Indeed, when the real
value of the seller's product depends on its actual use,
tying it to a second item whose use varies in fixed
proportions, allows the seller to maximize her returns from
the use of the core product 126 . In attempting to set
different prices to the different users, the seller would
encounter two problems 1 . On the one hand, estimation of the
real intensity of use by each buyer might be inconvenient,
if not very difficult. On the other hand, it would probably
lead the low users to resell the product to those who paid a
higher price. Therefore, tying contracts may be adequate
counter devices, in which the tied item's purpose is to
measure how intensively the tying product is actually
used 128 . In this context, the seller price discriminates her
different buyers 129 . Still, this function of tie-ins may be
very appropriate to the trademark licensor. Indeed, the rate
of the royalty in counterpart of the lease of a trademark as
well as the value of the trademark itself highly depend on
23
the effective use of the trademark by licensees 130 . Or,
accurate valuation of such use is costly and often
difficult . Therefore, tying the license of the trademark
to the products or services it is stapled on can provide the
licensor with a very efficient as well as precise counter
device
.
Finally, and most relevant in the trademark licensing
context, tying may be used to control the quality of the
branded products or services. For long, licensing of
trademarks was prohibited on the ground that it could
mislead purchasers into believing that the goods came from
the proprietor of the mark while they actually originated
from a different source 13 ". Because of obvious business
realities 133 , the Lanham Act now implicitly recognizes the
validity of trademark licensing 134 . Nevertheless, to
safeguard consumers from being misled, the Act subordinates
the validity of a trademark license to the condition that
the licensor control the quality and the nature of the
products or services to be sold under his mark. The
rationale is that absent such a control, the mark may no
longer acts as an indicator of constant quality, and
therefore, may deceive the purchasers 135 . Logically, such a
misleading mark should be defended protection. Indeed,
failure by the licensor to fulfill his duty has very harsh
consequences. In such a case, the license is deemed
"naked" 13 '3 , and the licensor's trademark is considered as
"abandoned", being thus free for appropriation by others
24
Pursuant to the Act, a mark is considered abandoned " [w]hen
any causes of conduct of the owner, including acts of
omission as well as commission, causes the mark to loose
its significance as a mark" 138 .
Given the crucial importance for the licensor to
maintain adequate control over the use of his mark, the
question at issue is thus how much quality control the
courts consider as sufficient to preserve the right to the
mark in the course of licensing. Unfortunately, the answer
is not as clear as expected. Commonly, to meet the Lanham
Act standards, the licensor may implement the quality
control requirement in two ways. The typical proof of
adequate control is obtained by means of inclusion into the
license agreement of various provisions evidencing that the
trademark holder will maintain control of the quality of the
goods manufactured and sold by the licensee 135 . Practically,
it includes the licensee's agreement to quality standards
established by the licensor, submission of plans, drawings,
preliminary models, and actual samples to the owner,
approval of the packaging , advertising and manner of
trademark use 140 . Even absent such express provisions, the
licensor may still fulfill his duty by exercising actual
control. Indeed, the courts often upheld the validity of
trademark licenses, despite the lack of formal monitoring
procedures. The rationale is that if, in fact, the quality
of the goods has been maintained, the purchasers were not
deceived, and the mark keeps its significance as an
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indicator of the quality standard expected pursuant to the
reputation of the mark 141 . For instance, in the Land 0' Lakes
case , the court considered that due to the forty years
experience of the licensee without any complaint from
purchasers, the licensor's reliance on his licensee's
quality control was evidence of "the taking of reasonable
measures to protect the quality of the goods bearing the
mark" 143 .
We see, when it comes to determine the amount of
quality control required, the courts put very heavy a burden
of proof on the claimant to a mark's abandonment action 144 .
Nevertheless, the severe consequence of the finding of a
^naked' license reinforced by the sometimes inconstant
rulings of the courts 140 , can lead licensors to strictly
monitor the use of their marks. In this prospective, what a
more efficient police than controlling the manufacturing
process of the goods ? Under this reasoning, trademark
owners often seek to guarantee the quality of the goods sold
under their brands by designating particular suppliers of
raw materials 14 . They sometimes go further to insure the
validity of their trademarks. Indeed, licensors may impose
to their licensees to buy the raw materials or others from
them, or at least not to buy them from specified
suppliers 149 . However, these practices are of the type which
are scrutinized under tying antitrust laws. Therefore,
drafters of trademark licenses must find the fine line of
equilibrium between monitoring the licensees so as to insure
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constant reputation to the trademark, and at the same time,
avoid forcing in order to comply with tying antitrust laws.
As the profusion of proceedings, along with the abundance of
the literature on the matter evidence it, it is not easy a
task as it requires constant attention on the regulation of
tying arrangements by the courts.
Ill
Antitrust Regulation of Tying Arrangements in Trademark Licensing up to
the Kodak Decision
Regulation of tying arrangements before the Kodak
decision was based on the supreme Court's case, Jefferson
Parish Hospital v. Hyde 15 , which principles fully apply to
trademark licensing. However, some weaknesses of the
methodology for prosecution have been highlighted due to the
specificity of trademarks, and have increased the necessity
for a clarification of the state of the law so as to ease
the interpretation of the jurisprudence in view of the
drafting of practicable licensing programs.
A Legal bases for prosecution
The competitive harm resulting from tying arrangements
characterized in business transactions as explained in
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States 15 ^ is twofold:
on the one hand, because of the forcing, the tied item is
excepted from the cold test of competition. Indeed,
competitors are bared free access to the tied product
market. On the other hand, buyers who abide with the terms
of the tie-in loose their freedom to shop around. Given
these premises, tying arrangements may be challenged under
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three different antitrust statutes. First of all, Section 3
of the Clayton Act forbids tying arrangements where the
effect of such conducts is "to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce" . However, Section 3 applies only when both the
tying and the tied items are "goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities" 11 ' 3 . Therefore, it
may not be used to challenge ties-in in which the tying item
is a trademark . Second of all, tying arrangements may be
prosecuted under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act , which prohibits, in broad terms, unfair methods or
acts of competition b . Finally, and the most appropriate in
the trademark context, tying arrangements may be prosecuted
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which states that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal..." 157 . Indeed, most, if not all, of the tying
arrangements found in trademark licensing were prosecuted
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. While theoretically,
tying arrangements may be challenged under both a rule of
reason and a per se approach, claimants suing licensors on
the ground that the alleged tying arrangement unreasonably
restrains competition barely ever succeeded . Accordingly,
antitrust regulation of tie-ins present in trademark
licensing commands the analysis of the elements to be met
for a per se violation.
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B Conditions for a finding of a per se illegal tie
Before the Kodak case, the latest Supreme Court
precedent addressing the issue of the validity of tying
arrangements was Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde 159 . In the
Hyde case 160 , the court, to hold that the exclusive contract
entered into between the hospital and a firm of
anesthesiologists which made it mandatory for the patients
undertaking surgery in the hospital to use the services of
specific anesthesiologists was not per se unlawful, ruled
that a finding of a per se unlawful tying arrangement
required four conditions: there must be two distinct
products (1), the buyers must be coerced to buy the two
products (2), the seller must have sufficient economic power
in the market of the tying product (3), and there must be a
not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied
product affected by the tying (4)
.
First of all, unlawful tying requires a showing that
the arrangement involves two different products. In
Jefferson Parish 101
, the court held that "the answer to the
question whether one or two products are involved turns not
on the functional relation between them, but rather on the
character of the demand for the two items." 1 ' According to
the court, in assessing whether the arrangement at issue
links two different products, one must determine whether the
two products are "distinguishable in the eyes of buyers." 1 '
The reason for the buyer's perception test is that the
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underlying rationale for the rule against tying is to
prohibit agreements creating a possibility to "foreclose [...]
competition on the merits in a product market distinct from
the market for the tying item" 104 . Accordingly, where no
evidence that two separate products exist in the eyes of the
buyers is found, there can not be any antitrust violation
since no risk of anticompetitive restraint exist in the
market
As far as trademark licensing is concerned, the
trademarked goods or services and the trademark are not
presumably considered to form one and a single product, nor
is franchising exempted from general antitrust rules 1 D .
Accordingly, the separability test set out in the Hyde case
turns to whether a trademark can be, in the eyes of the
buyers, a separate product from the trademarked goods or
services or other items sold with the lease of the
trademark. The answer to this question depends on the
circumstances of each case. For instance, in the Diet Center
franchise, the franchisor was alleged to have engaged in an
illegal tying consisting of requiring as a condition to the
franchise, that franchisees purchase from him the
nutritional tablets to be sold to Diet Center clients 1 . The
court found that no illegal tying could be characterized as
"the demand for the Diet Supp is not separate from that of
the franchise" 168 . Likewise, the courts ruled that, absent a
separate demand for the Power Test Petroleum trademark and
the gasoline, no illegal tie could be found D " . Some courts,
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instead, held the trademark constituted a separate product
from the goods or services it is attached to. However, most
of these cases were decided using a different test from the
separate demand test set out in the Hyde case.
In assessing whether two distinct products were linked
together to form a tying, some courts have focused on the
functional relationship between the trademark and the
products or services allegedly tied to its license 170 . Under
this rationale, consideration must be given to the kind of
license granted by the trademark holder 171 . Where the
franchise is a "distribution type of system [...] the
franchised outlets serve merely as conduits through which
the trademarked goods of the franchisor flow to the ultimate
consumer"
172
, the trademark "serves merely as a
representation of the end product marketed by the system"
In this context, the "desirability of the trademark and the
quality of the product it represents are so inextricably
interrelated in the mind of the consumer as to preclude any
finding that the trademark is a separate item for tie-in
purposes. " 4 In contrast, under a business format system,
where "the franchisor merely provides the trademark and, in
some cases, supplies used in operating the franchised outlet
and producing the system' s products [...] there is generally
only a remote connection between the trademark and the
products the franchisees are compelled to purchase [...]
because consumers have no reason to associate with the
trademark, those components used either in the operation of
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the franchisee! store or in the manufacture of the end
product." ' According to the courts using the functionality
test, it is only under such a business franchise/license
format that the trademark may be a separate product,
possibly leading to a finding of an illegal tie.
It results from the case law that the license of a
trademark may be found a separate product from the products
or services it is leased with either if the trademark and
the goods are viewed as separate products in the eyes of the
buyers (a), or if the trademark licensing is a business
format type of license/franchise (b) . In this respect, it is
worth noting that when trademark licensing occurs in the
context of merchandising, the trademark will probably be
considered as a separate product from the trademarked items
since merchandising is a kind of business type format of
licensing
.
Once a separate product or service from the trademark
has been identified, the next step for the antitrust
claimant is to show that the trademark holder forced the
licensee to take the "tied" items in order to be granted the
use of the trademark. Conditioning the availability of the
trademark to the sale of other items is a necessary element
to an illegal tie. As reaffirmed by the Court in the Hyde
case, "the essential characteristic of an invalid tying
arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control
over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase
of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all,
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or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
terms." ' Instead, when the buyer is free to take only one
item or the items separately, there is not tying problem177 .
Accordingly, it is only when there is evidence that the
coercion is present, that there is a tying concern. It is
now well settled that when the licensor requires the
licensee to buy the supposedly tied items from approved
sources to meet the licensor' s trademark quality standards
or live up with the franchise uniformity, there is no
forcing so long as the licensor has no financial stake in
the companies where the items are to be bought from178 .
The question raised by the conditioning requirement is
what coercive pressure is needed to prove that the buyers
were actually forced to take not only the trademark but a
whole package including unwanted items. Proof of
conditioning may be established by the agreement entered
into between the trademark holder and the licensee whereby
the licensor expressly requires its licensees to take
separate items as a condition to the grant of the use of its
trademark 179 , or at least not to take them from other
suppliers 180 . Even absent formal conditioning, the claimant
may establish that the licensees were actually forced to
take unwanted items. However, there is no clear answer as to
what circumstantial factual element is sufficient to
evidence coercion. Some lower courts have interpreted the
ruling in Jefferson Parish that "per se condemnation [...] is
appropriate if the existence of forcing is probable"" so
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that forcing may be induced from the demonstration that the
licensor enjoys sufficient economic power in the tying
product market (the trademark) 11 . Accordingly, these courts
require only the showing of three conditions 183 .
As far as the sufficient economic or market power
condition is concerned, it requires the antitrust claimant
to demonstrate that the trademark holder has the requisite
power in the market of the trademark to appreciably
restrains competition in the tied item market. In Jefferson
Parish
, market power has been defined as the "special
ability to force a purchaser to do something that he would
not do in a competitive market" 185 . The analysis of the case
law shows that the exercise by the trademark owner of such
power over his brand may be established in three ways.
Firstly, market power may be induced from the large market
share held by the licensor in the market of the trademark.
In the Hyde case, the Supreme Court found that a market
share of 30 % was not sufficient to demonstrate the
requisite market power 186 . Since then, a number of lower
courts have required a market share of 30 % as a minimum
threshold 187 . In addition to showing market power through the
dominant position of the licensor, sufficient economic power
may be inferred from the proof that a substantial number of
licensees have accepted the tie-in, and that there is no
explanations other than the seller/licensor's economic power
for the willingness of the purchasers/licensees to do so
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Finally, and more peculiar to trademark licensing tying
cases, is the demonstration of market power by means of the
uniqueness of the trademark or its particular appeal to the
consumer
189
. As to the degree of uniqueness or desirability
necessary to prove by the antitrust claimant, most of the
courts have required the showing of a barrier to entry that
prevents competition. This barrier may be either legal
(copyrighted or patented items) 1 or economic (cost
advantage) . Under this rationale, uniqueness is
demonstrated not merely by the fact that the packaged
trademark license is not being offered by the licensor's
competitors, but rather by the inability of the latter to
offer such package 192 . On this ground, in many cases claims
of uniqueness of a trademark have been rejected as the
claimant could not demonstrate that the trademark holder
license system provided him with a competitive advantage
that could not be duplicated 193 . A few lower courts have
considered trademarks, as statutory rights, to be presumably
unique, and, as a matter of law, to evidence the requisite
economic power for the purpose of tying antitrust
violations 194 . The majority of the case law recognizes
however that trademarks, as opposed to copyrights or patents
which grant "a right in gross or at large", "merely identify
the franchisor" 195 , and thus allow enterprises to compete on
the merits. It is worth noting that in Jefferson Parish 196 ,
the majority rejected the argument that market imperfections
such as the lack of information could generate economic
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power to the benefit of the seller by locking-in consumers
to purchase the tied item 1 . Accordingly, to succeed in his
action, the antitrust claimant must show that the trademark
holder wields market power, whether that he holds a large
share of the market, that a substantial number of licensees
have accepted the package, or that his package is unique.
The last condition for the application of the per se
treatment to tying arrangements present in trademark
licensing is "that a not insubstantial amount of interstate
commerce" 19 ' in the tied item market must be affected. This
test focuses on the aggregate and total amount of dollar
amount of commerce affected 199 , rather than on the share of
the market 200 . As an example, $ 50,000. was considered to be
a not insubstantial amount of commerce 201 . Once the four
elements of a per illegal tying are evidenced in a trademark
licensing program, the Sherman Act is violated and the
licensor's system struck down, except in very restricted
circumstances where the anticompetitive conduct may be
justified
.
C BUSINESS JUSTIFICATIONS
Although the issue of legitimate business
justifications or defenses was not specifically addressed in
Jefferson Parish 20 ^ as no illegal tie could be characterized,
the antitrust defendant may defeat a tying claim if he can
demonstrate that his conduct is justified. When it turns to
trademark licensing cases, the justification for tying the
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trademarked items to the lease of the trademark itself lies
in the protection of the goodwill developed by the licensor
in connection with the trademark. As analyzed, a trademark
holder may efficiently grant the right to use his brand to
licensees only provided that he retains sufficient control
over the quality of the products or services marketed under
the trademark . In this prospective, tying the sale or the
supply of the branded products or services to the lease of
the trademark may be an appropriate means to ensure that all
the items marketed under a same trademark are of uniform
quality. This reasoning has been endorsed by the courts in
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp. 204 where the
majority held that "business arrangements which conceptually
could be styled ^tie-in' might be exculpated from the reach
of the anti-trust laws if the arrangement was actuated by or
could be explained on the basis of a legitimate business
justification as opposed to an improper motive, e. g.,
desire to increase market control through the economic
leverage supplied by the tying arrangement"
However, the legitimate business justification defense
encounters some obstacles. On the one hand, as a defense,
the burden of proof of the reasonableness of the arrangement
swifts on the antitrust defendant. On the other hand, the
analysis of the case law shows the reluctance of the courts,
once the have identified a tying arrangement, to validate it
on the ground of the goodwill protection defense.
Accordingly, the issue turns to the amount of evidence
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necessary to demonstrate that a tying arrangement present in
a trademark licensing program serves a legitimate purpose of
safeguarding the essence of the system through the
preservation of a uniform quality standard. The general test
is whether it exists a less restrictive alternative than
tying the products or services to the trademark206 .
It results from the rulings of the courts in
franchising cases that the goodwill protection defense will
be accepted only in cases where the antitrust defendant
shows that he cannot ensure the requisite uniform quality
standard through specifications or that the products or
services are not available elsewhere 207 . Under this
rationale, arrangements which tie standardized products to
the lease of the trademark such as ice cream mixes
,
cookers, fryers and packaging supplies ° , or replacement
parts 210 , and the quality of which may reasonably be achieved
through specifications or approved sources are refused the
legitimate business justification defense. In this respect,
despite the absence of precedents relating to tying
arrangements present in trademark licensing in the context
of merchandising, it is probable that such arrangements, if
found illegal, could not be legitimate as, by essence, they
relate to the marketing of standardized items, the quality
standards of which may be achieved through specifications.
Instead, where specifications or approved sources are not
reasonably practicable to meet the uniform quality
standards, the courts recognize the goodwill protection to
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constitute a valid tying antitrust defense. For example, it
was judged that the tie of mattresses to the license of the
trademark and signs to motel owners advertising the use of
beautyrest mattresses did not violate the antitrust laws on
the ground that it was legitimate for the trademark owner to
ensure that customers would not use mattresses of inferior
quality that impair the trademark's reputation 211 . Likewise,
the courts have considered that when the alleged tied item
is manufactured pursuant to a trade secret, the
specification alternative is not available, and therefore
the x tying' arrangement is justified . Less evident, is the
upholding by the courts of a franchise system where the
lease of the trademark was tied to the sale of replacement
parts 213 . The court reasoned that although there may have
been alternative means of protecting quality such as
approving sources and providing products specifications, it
would not disturb the jury's verdict since the tie-in may
have been the least expensive and most effective means of
policing quality" .
It results from the case law that except in limited
circumstances where the tie-in is the most practicable means
to achieve the uniform quality standard, and provided that
it is clearly evidenced, the reasonableness of tying clauses
present in trademark licensing is precluded from analysis.
This strict treatment of tying arrangements along with the
absence of clear standards for the application of the per se
condemnation has led to criticisms.
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D Critics of the state of the law
The main critic arising from the regulation of tying
arrangement in accordance with the Supreme Court cases lies
in the per se label of ties, which prevents the lower courts
from taking into account the possible benefits of a tying,
and leads to inconsistencies in the interpretation of the
elements of an illegal tie. As reaffirmed in Jefferson
Parish
, the per se label applies to conducts which are
deemed unreasonable as matter of law, and accordingly,
condemned without an inquiry into the market conditions. The
underlying rationale for such a strict treatment is that in
such conducts the likelihood of their restrictive character
is so great as to render unjustified the costs and time of
determining whether a particular conduct being investigated
effectively involves anti-competitiveness" D . The consequence
is that once the per se labeled conduct is identified, it is
condemned with almost no possibility for its author to
justify it on economic grounds . Or, as analyzed , a
finding of an illegal tie requires, notably, the showing of
the presence of two distinct products as well as the
detention by the seller of market power. Whereas the one or
two products issue focuses on the consumer' s demand , and
the sufficient economic power one, on an inquiry into the
seller's competitive position" 20 , both elements involve an
analysis into the market conditions 221 . Therefore, the legal
antitrust standards applicable to tying arrangements do not
strictly follow the per se doctrine, of which it results
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that "tying doctrine incurs the costs of a rule of reason
approach without achieving its benefits" 222 .
This weakness of the methodology22 has led to the
confusion in the lower courts' interpretation of the
regulation of tying arrangements, in particular in the
trademark licensing context. The consideration of the actual
economic effects of a tying arrangement only as a defense to
a finding of an already proven illegal arrangement almost
precludes trademark holders from succeeding in their
goodwill protection claim or other business justification 224 .
Or, many courts, including the Supreme Court in Jefferson
Parish
, have concluded that tying may serve acceptable
purposes. In Susser v. Carvel Corp. 220 , the Justice Friendly
disagreed with the majority ruling that general standard set
out to assess the reasonableness of tying arrangements in
view of their justification are applicable to elements
representing a franchise system. The concurring opinion held
that general cases "are scarcely relevant to the problem of
controlling something so insusceptible of precise
verbalization as the desired texture and test of an ice
cream cone or sundae" ', and accordingly, specifications are
not practicable. Likewise, in Kentucky Fried Chicken v.
diversified Packaging Corp. ' :8 , the majority considered that
it was "less than self evident""' that tying present in
franchising "should be treated as a garden-variety of tie-
ins" 230 , on the ground that the franchisor's success largely
depends on the guality of the franchisees' performance,
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which requires a tight monitoring so as to ensure harmonized
reputation" . Besides the possible benefit of tying based on
the goodwill protection, packaging may be an effective means
to preserve small business as opposed to monopolizing
enterprises. In Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp. 232
,
the court considered that "a packaging franchise system may
be a way to compete with larger firms while retaining the
advantages of independent ownership" 233 .
Through the showing of the economic benefits of tying
in the franchise context, the lower courts suggest that tie-
ins should be analyzed under the rule of reason approach,
where the actual economic effects, such as quality control
are a real issue, and are weighted as against the possible
anticompetitive effect of the forcing. However, absent such
an approach by the Supreme Court" 34 , the lower courts have,
to soften the harsh consequences of the strict application
of the per se doctrine, widely discussed on the definition
of what makes a tying illegal. This tendency, which does not
bring clarity 23 as to the proper legal standard to be
followed by the trademark licensing drafters, is perceptible
especially in two respects. Firstly, a finding of a per se
illegal tie is subordinated to the demonstration that two
different products or services are involved" c . Or despite
the clear test established by the majority in Jefferson
Parish237
, some lower courts have kept on applying another
test, taking into account the function of the trademark in
the franchise system" 38 . This analysis does not allow to draw
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a clear line of interpretation in view of the drafting of
licensing programs 239 . Secondly, despite the Supreme Court's
express rejection of an inquiry into the possible
reasonableness of tie-ins, few lower courts have added a
fifth condition to the four requisite conditions for a
finding of a per se illegal tying. According to them,
conclusion that a franchise system includes an illegal tie
requires the showing that there is a "substantial danger
that the tying seller will acquire market power in the tied
product market" 240 .
As a result of the differing lower courts'
interpretations of the law of tying arrangements, trademark
holders are condemned to set up licensing programs with no
certainty that they will pass the test of tying antitrust
challenges. Accordingly, commentators as well as
practitioners 41 have expected the Supreme Court to abandon
the per se label of tying or at least to clarify the legal
standards for prosecution when it granted certiorari in a
tying case, Eastman Kodak Co., v. Image Technical services,
9 4?
Inc. .
IV
Impact of the Kodak decision on the law of tying: no legal predictability
as to the validity of tying clauses
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an
antitrust tying case both scholars and practitioners had
hopped that the outcome of the case would clarify the law of
tying. Despite this great opportunity to ease the task of
interpreters, and in particular for drafters of trademark
licensing agreements, the majority opinion by its confusing
wording as well as left-open reasoning, rendered the
forecast of potential antitrust tying challenges even less
predictable
.
A The Kodak decision
Eastman Kodak company manufactures and sells
photocopiers and micrographic eguipment . These complex
business machines are unigue in the sense that they are not
compatible with Kodak's competitors' machines . Kodak also
sells service an replacement parts for its eguipment to its
customers. The parts are produced either by Kodak itself or
by independent original-eguipment manufacturers (OEMs), on
the basis of orders made by Kodak 244 . After the initial
warranty period, Kodak offers service either through annual
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service contract, which include all necessary parts, or on a
per-call basis . Kodak charges different prices for
equipment, parts and service, depending on the bargaining
position of its customers 246 . In the early 80s, 18
independent service organizations (ISOs) began repairing and
servicing Kodak copying and micrographic equipment. They
also sold parts and reconditioned and sold used equipment.
ISOs' service is provided at a substantial lower price than
Kodak's, and some customers found the ISO service to be of
higher quality . While some customers purchased their own
parts and hired ISOs only for service, others hired ISOs to
supply both service and parts. In 1985 and 1986, Kodak
implemented a new policy with respect to the sale and supply
of parts and service. On the one hand, it decided to sell
replacement parts for its equipment only to customers of
Kodak equipment who use Kodak service or repair their own
machines. On the other hand, Kodak entered into an agreement
with the OEMs whereby the latter would not sell parts to fit
Kodak equipment to anyone other than Kodak. Finally, Kodak
pressured equipment owners and independent parts
distributors not to sell Kodak parts to ISOs. As a result of
this policy aimed at restricting the access to Kodak'
s
replacement parts, ISOs were unable to obtain parts from
reliable sources, and therefore encountered great
difficulties to supply service for Kodak machines.
Accordingly, many ISOs were forced out of business, while
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others lost substantial revenues, and their customers had to
switch to Kodak service
In 1987, the ISOs filed an action against Kodak
alleging that the latter had unlawfully tied the sale of
service for Kodak machines to the sale of parts in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and had unlawfully
monopolized or attempted to monopolize the sale of service,
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The District
Court, without an hearing, granted summary judgment in favor
of Kodak. The Court of Appeals reversed the case, and
required a trial^ on the following grounds.
With respect to the section 1 claim, the Court
considered that whether the arrangement included one or two
distinct products, and whether a tying existed between them
were disputed issues of facts 260 . In particular, the majority
addressed the issue of whether Kodak wielded sufficient
economic power in the parts market to appreciably restrain
competition in the service market 251 . On this issue, the
Court conceded to Kodak that competition in the equipment
market may preclude a finding of market power in the parts
market, however, it refused to uphold the District Court's
ruling "on this theoretical basis" as "market imperfections
can keep economic theories about how consumers will act from
mirroring realities" 252 . Then, the Court considered the
business justifications alleged by Kodak and ruled that
there should be analyzed whether a less restrictive
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alternative existed for Kodak to achieve its quality-related
goals 253 .
As to the section 2 claim, the Court concluded that it
existed sufficient evidence to support a finding of attempt
to monopolize . The Supreme Court granted certiorari and,
in a five-to-three opinion, affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals denying summary judgment 255 . According to
Justice Blackmun, who delivered the majority opinion, the
principal issue was "whether a defendant's lack of market
power in the primary equipment market precludes -- as a
matter of law - the possibility of market power in
derivative aftermarkets" 256 .
With respect to the section 1 of the Sherman Act claim,
while the core issue was the one relating to market power,
the majority successively questioned the four elements
characterizing an illegal tie to determine whether there was
sufficient evidence to support that grant of summary
judgment had to be rejected. As far as the one or two
products issue, the Court, applying the consumer demand test
of Jerfferson Parish Hospital 251 , considered that there was
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that parts and
service were two distinct products since both had been and
were still sold separately 258 . In this respect, the judges
rejected Kodak's argument that because parts and service
were functionally linked they should be considered as one
single product 259 . Concerning the coercion requirement, the
majority held that there was sufficient evidence of a tie
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between parts and service 260 . With respect to the not
insubstantial amount of commerce affected in the tied
market, the Court did not analyze its materiality as Kodak
did not dispute this issue 261 . Turning then to the core issue
of the case at bar, the majority ruled that, notwithstanding
the presence of competition in the primary market for
equipment, Kodak may still wield market power in the
secondary market for replacement parts due to the presence
of market imperfections that raise barriers for competitors
to entry the market for service 262 . In reaching its
conclusion, the Court followed a two-prong reasoning.
First, Justice Blackmun recalled that legal
y fi ^presumptions are generally not favored in antitrust laws
In particular, when addressing the market power issue, the
economic realities of the market at issue must be closely
examined so as to determine "the responsiveness of the sale
of one product to price changes of the other" (> .
Accordingly, the Court rejected Kodak's argument that
competition in the primary market for equipment precluded,
as a matter of law, the actual exercise of market power in
the secondary market for parts 265 . With nearly 100 % of the
parts market, Kodak had market power as defined as "the
ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict
output" 266 . However, it contended that it could not
effectively exercise it because a raise of prices in
equipment aftermarkets (parts and service) would not
compensate the loss of profits in the equipment market
4Q
resulting from the consumers purchasing equipment/service
from more attractive sources 267 . Therefore, according to
Kodak, competition in the equipment market prevents it, as a
matter of law, to wield its market power in the parts
i 4-268market
For the Court, instead, exercise of market power must
be assessed on the cross-elasticity of demand i.e. the
change in consumer's consumption of Kodak's competitors
products in response to the price change in Kodak's parts 269 .
In particular, contrary to Kodak's assertion, the Court
considered that Kodak could set an optimum price where the
revenues from the parts and service would more than
compensate the loss of profits from equipment
Accordingly, the majority concluded that competition in the
equipment market may coexist with market power in the
aftermarkets for parts and service.
Second, the Court turned to the analysis of the actual
economic conditions of the market at issue, and in
particular, consumers' behaviors. It considered that because
of the showing of information as well as switching costs
along with a discriminatory pricing policy evidenced by
ISOs, Kodak's theory that it could not actually exercise its
market power in the parts market to appreciably restrain
competition in the service market was not reasonable" .
According to the Court, Kodak's economic explanation for its
supracompetitive prices for service was not reasonably
sustainable since there was no evidence that equipment
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sales' dropped because of the presence of competition in the
equipment market" . Instead, the behavior of the consumers
(switch from ISOs to Kodak) in the equipment/parts/service
markets, markets for complex durable goods, may accurately
be explained, as contended by ISOs, by the existence of
significant information and switching costs 273 .
First, the cross-elasticity of the demand may normally
operate only provided that consumers get all the necessary
information on the lifecycle pricing of the
equipment/parts/service package at the time of the purchase
of the equipment. This information is often technically
difficult to obtain for complex and durable goods because it
is not available. Though available, the consumer may choose
not to obtain it because it acquisition and processing are
expensive 4 . In this respect, Kodak contended that behavior
of these unsophisticated consumers would be balanced by the
one of sophisticated consumers, i.e. consumers who undertake
the comparative study, which would force Kodak to charge
competitive prices for its package 275 . Agreeing with this
argument, the majority however pointed out that, for such a
pressure to be effective on pricing, two conditions should
be cumulatively met. The volume of sophisticated consumers
must be substantial so as for the loss of profits deriving
from the loss of these consumers to outweigh the gain of
profits from supracompetitive prices charged to
unsophisticated consumers 276 . More importantly, there should
be no possibility of price discrimination between the
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unsophisticated and sophisticated consumers. Or, Kodak
actually price discriminated between its different
consumers. Accordingly, lack of the requisite information on
the package pricing may actually restrict the switch of
consumers from Kodak to other manufacturers, and enable the
former to raise its prices above competitive prices, which
it effectively did 277 .
Second, if the costs incurred to switch from one
product to another are high, the consumers are somehow
"locked-in", and will accordingly tolerate higher prices
than competitive before changing of brand278 . The seller may
even exercise more easily its market power to raise prices
if it can price discriminate between locked-in consumers and
new consumers
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. Or, because of the uniqueness of Kodak's
equipment, along with the possibility to price discriminate,
switching costs act as a barrier to the threat of
substantial loss in equipment sales' . For the above
reasons, the majority held that the presence of market
imperfections, as well as the policy of Kodak to price
discriminate between its customers could enable it to
effectively exercise its market power in the parts market to
appreciably restrain competition in the service market, as
it did since ISOs were excluded from the service market
As for the section 2 of the Sherman Act claim, the
majority ruled that it was unreasonable to grant Kodak
summary judgment as there was sufficient evidence to support
the two elements of a claim for monopolization or attempt to
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monopolize 28 ". The first condition for a section 2 claim is
the possession of monopoly power 283 . With nearly 100 % of the
parts market and 80 % to 95 % of the service market, Kodak
has the requisite monopoly power for the purpose of a
monopoly claim284 . However, it contended that a single brand
of a service or a product could not, as a matter of law, be
a relevant market 285 . Relying on the demand-side
substitutability test, the majority rejected Kodak's
assertion as the choice for Kodak's equipment consumers were
limited to Kodak parts and corresponding service since the
equipment are not interchangeable with other manufacturers'
parts and service . Accordingly, instead of legal
presumption, a finding on the definition of the relevant
market required a "factual inquiry into the commercial
realities faced by [equipment] consumers" 287 .
As for the second condition, the Court after rejecting
the allegedly valid business justifications of Kodak
considered that there was sufficient evidence that Kodak
took willful exclusionary action to maintain its parts
monopoly and used it to strengthen its market position in
the service market through the creation of entry barriers
Therefore, similarly to the tying claim, the majority
opinion held that Kodak did not bring sufficient evidence to
support that it was unreasonable to reject a monopolization
or attempt to monopolize claim290 . While rejecting the grant
for summary judgment, the Court however noted that,
supported on sufficient evidence, Kodak's arguments of the
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presence of a unified market where equipment, parts and
service act as pure components, that competition in the
equipment market actually discipline the aftermarkets for
parts and service so that the overall price of the package
is competitive, and that the anticompetitive effects of its
conduct are outweighed by its economic benefits may
eventually be correct 291 .
The dissenting opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia
would have concluded to the rejection of the Court of
Appeals' decision. This position was grounded on three main
critics of the majority's reasoning.
First, Justice Scalia disagreed with the finding that a
single-branded aftermarkets may be a relevant product market
for the purposes of antitrust laws for three reasons. Such
finding on the relevant product market would be potentially
applicable to any manufacturer of durable goods closely
associated with secondary unique or relatively unique
products or services 292 . Moreover, this approach is
inconsistent for products which are inherently associated in
their functioning so that their consumer base is identical,
such as for parts and service 9 . Finally, according to the
dissent, the majority reasoning fails to consider that
before buying Kodak's 'package', Kodak had to compete with
other suppliers so that other sources may fall within the
relevant product market 294 . Accordingly, applying the
majority test for determining the relevant product market
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would almost always lead to the conclusion of the possession
of market power 295 , and corresponding illegal tie.
Second, on the core issue of the determination of
market power, Justice Scalia also criticized the majority
opinion in three respects. As for the proper inquiry for the
cross-elasticity test, according to the dissent only
behaviors of rational consumers are to be considered, not
those of irrational consumers, which are not the concern of
the application of the antitrust laws 6 . With respect to the
inference of market power from the presence of market
imperfections, the dissent noted that not only such market
imperfections as information or switching costs are present
in almost every real world markets 297 , whether competitive or
not, but also that these imperfections, which create some
"circumstantial leverage" 2 " do not generate the requisite
market power, essential for the finding of a per se illegal
tying.
Finally, and based on the foregoing criticisms, the
dissent concluded that, where competition is present in the
interbrand market, tying arrangements pursued through
intrabrand market power should be analyzed under the rule of
reason . The reasoning of Justice Scalia was that, contrary
to the rationale for the application of the per se
doctrine , in the absence of interbrand market power, this
competitive environment at the upper level will generally
prevent restrains at the intrabrand level 30 '. Moreover, a
manufacturer's bundling of aftermarket products may serve
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legitimate purposes such as ensuring the quality standards
302
of its goods, or facilitate information availability
Accordingly, the Court should have balanced the potential
procompetitive benefits of the tying at bar with its
anticompetitive costs. However, although it was urged to
hold so, the majority opinion did not expressly abandon the
per se doctrine, thus leaving aside the potential economic
benefits of tie-ins. Instead, it facilitated the
characterization of market power, and consequently favored
tying antitrust challenges, in particular in trademark
licensing programs.
B The impact of Kodak on the law of tying in trademark licensing
PROGRAMS
The effective impact of the Kodak' s ruling on the
drafting of trademark licensing programs requires prior
analysis of the effects of the majority opinion on the
regulation of tying arrangements present in trademark
licensing. Consistent with the critics raised against the
law of tie-ins affecting trademark licensing before the
Kodak case 303 , the decision has a potential effect mainly in
three respects. Not only did the Justices not clarify the
general treatment of tying--under the per se label or the
rule of reason--, but most importantly, they narrowed the
definition of the relevant market to single-branded products
or services and, accordingly, lowered the market power
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screen that conditions the condemnation of tying
arrangements
.
1 Increased uncertainty as to the method of analysis: per
se label or rule of reason
Despite the golden opportunity it had to ease the task
of interpretation for practitioners and lower courts, the
majority opinion made no reference to the essential question
of per se versus rule of reason treatment for tie-ins
This silence may be interpreted in either direction. On the
one hand, it may be induced from the fact that the ISOs had
waived their rule of reason claim that the majority was
addressing the validity of the agreement at bar only under
the per se doctrine. This view is reinforced by the holding
of the majority, which stated that "[w]e need not decide
whether Kodak' s behavior has any procompetitive effects and,
if so, whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects" ,
and implies that the unreasonableness of tie-ins is
presumed
.
On the other hand, the Court's holding that it
disfavored legal presumptions and, instead, invited the
lower courts to ground their reasoning on a case-by-case
analysis of "economic reality of the market at issue" 31
suggests its willingness to depart from strict legal labels
to focus on the factual conditions of the case at issue. Or,
this method is closer to the rule of reason approach than
the per se doctrine. This trend of the jurisprudence would
be supported by the view of the Antitrust division of the
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Department of Justice as, pursuant to paragraph 5.3 of the
1995 IP Licensing Guidelines 307 , tying arrangements are
treated under the rule of reason. It is stated that the
Government will challenge tying only if (1) the seller has
market power in the tying product, (2) the arrangement has
an adverse effect on competition in the market for tied
product, and (3) efficiency justifications do not outweigh
the anticompetitive effect 308 . However, absent an express
rejection of the per se doctrine by the Supreme Court, the
lower courts, though confused, are reluctant to endorse a
clear rule of reason approach 309 .
It results from the foregoing that, when turning to the
consideration of the potential economic benefits of tying
arrangements present in trademark licensing, the Kodak
decision does not tell more than before how to consider
them. Are legitimate business justifications to be accounted
for while analyzing the reality of market conditions of the
market involved ? Or, is the quality control argument
restricted to a limited defense to a finding of an illegal
tie ? 31 As stated, the outcome of this issue is of crucial
importance in the context of trademark licensing 311 . Not only
does it allow the trademark holder to efficiently enforce
its brand , but it would provide licensing program drafters
with a safety provision ensuring the stability of a given
trademark licensing system. While practical guidance would
be much appreciated, the view of the antirust division of
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the Department of Justice is contradictory with the Kodak'
s
ruling, somehow attenuated by the lower courts'
interpretation
.
In accordance with the 1995 IP Licensing guidelines,
the Federal authorities, while assessing the legality of
tying arrangements indicated that they would weigh the
anticompetitive effect of the conduct with efficiency
justifications l . In particular, with respect to package
licensing, the 1995 IP Licensing Guidelines state that "when
multiple licenses are needed to practice any single item of
intellectual property [...] a package may present such
efficiency" . This consideration may be of great relevance
when the trademark is licensed together with another
proprietary right such as a trade secret in the franchising
context, or a copyright in the multi-media or the
merchandising context. This view has been followed by some
courts, which held that "[bjuyers often find package sales
attractive; a seller's decision to offer such packages can
merely be an attempt to compete efficiently - conduct that
is entirely consistent with the Sherman Act //Jl5 .
Yet, in Kodak, the majority rejected all the business
reasons sustained by the defendant to justify its conduct
and, in particular, the goodwill protection one 31 °.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, one can wonder whether
the courts will consider the business justifications to
balance the potential anticompetitive effect of a tying
clause present in a trademark license, whether this
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consideration will extend to any efficient reason as
suggested by the 1995 IP Licensing Guidelines 317 , or will be
limited to the least restrictive one, as ruled prior to
Kodak 318 ? Finally, one may question whether the efficiency-
driven defense encompasses the goodwill protection or is
limited to package licensing. Unfortunately, the Justices in
Kodak, by refusing to draw the method of analysis for tying
arrangement and, accordingly, to guide practitioners as well
as lower courts as to the weight to be given to business
justifications did not provide clarity to the law 319 . This
failure is especially prejudicial in view of the Supreme
Court's ruling in connection with the narrowing of the
relevant market to single-branded products, which eventually
facilitate findings of illegal tie-ins.
2 Single-Branded goods as relevant market
the ruling of the majority in Kodak that single-branded
products or services may well define a relevant product
market for the purpose of antitrust law has potentially a
great impact on the regulation of tying present in trademark
licensing. The value of a given trademark upon which is
based a franchise or merchandising program lies in its
uniqueness or attractiveness and, thus in its ability to
differentiate the branded items of one source from another
source
320
. Accordingly, consistent with Kodak, numerous
trademark or complementary items to a franchise or
merchandising program may be considered as defining a
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relevant product market and, therefore facilitate the
finding of market power enjoyed by the trademark holder.
The market definition criteria set out in Kodak departs
from the general market definition test, the effect of which
on trademark has already been identified. Generally, a
relevant product market is defined in terms of the
substitute products to which a purchaser may reasonably
turn 321 . Substitutability of goods is usually assessed
depending on the cross-elasticity of the demand and the
supply. As to the demand side of the market, are part of the
same market the products, the demand for which changes in
response to the increase of the price of another product
With respect to the supply side of the market, are normally
part of the same product market the items of the
manufacturers who actually or potentially compete with one
another 3 " 3 . Following this latter rationale, lower courts
have generally refused to consider the products of a sole
manufacturer to define a separate product market or
submarket 24 . However, in Kodak, the Supreme Court held that
Kodak' s replacement parts and servicing were two separate
products markets distinct from the primary market for
equipment 325 . In reaching this opinion, the majority
considered that, because of market imperfections which
locked-in consumers, the cross-elasticity test was limited
to the demand side interchangeability . In other words,
substitute products, the demand for which responded to the
increase in the prices for parts or servicing had to be
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determined once the lock-in had occurred, thus excluding the
actual or potential competition of other manufacturer's
products 326 .
In accordance with Kodak, a finding that single-branded
products be defined as a relevant product market requires
three elements. First, the products or services at issue
must be complementary goods to durable goods, which may be
supplied only from one supplier or a limited number of
suppliers . Second, there must be some high switching costs
from the seller' s goods to another manufacturer' s ones
Finally, and most importantly, there must be a lack in the
availability of the information, the knowledge of which
would allow customers to reasonably foresee the life-cycle
price of the package they buy. Such after purchase or
aftertie lack of information generate the lock-in and,
accordingly, pursuant to the Kodak's ruling, justifies that
the relevant product market be determined only under the
demand-side substitutability test.
While criticized by some commentators 3 " and courts 330
,
this reasoning has been endorsed by other lower courts 331
,
which tend to consider that where the conditions will be
met, Kodak's criteria for relevant product market definition
are likely to have adverse effects in the trademark
licensing context.
First, the factual circumstances of Kodak--sale of
durable goods in connection with unique or almost unique
complementary items--is very similar to the circumstances
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under which a trademark is licensed in two respects. On the
one hand, licensees seek to take a particular trademark
because of the attractiveness of the latter, which allows
customers to differentiate the trademarked items from those
of other sources . In this sense, each trademark is somehow
unique and not interchangeable as complex equipment is. On
the other hand, no matter the context where it occurs,
franchising or merchandising, the license of a trademark
usually comes with a bundle of complementary components. For
example, in franchising, the franchisor will provide the
franchisee with training, supplies, or other proprietary
rights 333 . These components, which are essential parts of the
attractiveness of the franchise, are also unique and, may
often be provided solely by the franchisor. Likewise, in
merchandising or multi-media projects, where the trademark
is associated to a copyright, the latter, though
complementary is essential to the functioning of the
project. Therefore, in the foregoing, like for equipment and
replacement parts, there is an essential functional link in
the package , which may generate a lock-in.
Second, because trademark license underlies business
opportunities for both parties, it is a medium to long term
agreement, which on the side of the licensee requires
significant investments 335 . For example, the franchisee is
likely to invest in building the physical plant, training
himself and his staff, or advertising 33 * . Accordingly, so
long as he has not recover from its investment through
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amortization, transfer or otherwise, the franchisee would
suffer high switching costs in case he would be willing to
change of business.
Third, and as the two first elements permitting to
define a single branded-product as a relevant product market
are likely to be present, the licensee may be locked-in.
however, consistent with Kodak, it seems that lack of
information as generating such locking should take place
prior to the tie, or at least be unforeseeable by a
reasonable licensee 337 . As in the Kodak case, there could be
a change in the policy of the licensor, requiring his
licensees to take some items only from him or at least not
to take them from other suppliers. In this respect, it could
be sustained that franchising agreement whereby franchisees
are required to buy items from approved sources may induce
the definition of the relevant product market as including
only the said approved suppliers since franchisees would be
locked-in with them338 .
It results from the foregoing that, the Kodak's
redefinition of the relevant product markets narrowed to
single-branded products put an increased threat on the
validity of trademark licensing agreement containing tying-
related clauses by lowering the market power screen, which,
until the Supreme Court's intervention, defined the border
between legal and illegal tie 339 .
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3 Lowering of the market power screen
Until Kodak, market power was to be evidenced for the
purpose of a finding of an illegal tie either directly by
the showing that the seller had raised prices above
competitive price, or indirectly through the demonstration
of the seller's market share, or the uniqueness of its
products 340 . In Kodak, the majority held that Kodak's market
power could be induced not only from the market share it
enjoyed in the parts market, but also from the analysis of
economic realities in the said market, which revealed the
existence of market imperfections such as information and
switching costs, and the presence of price discrimination
between sophisticated and unsophisticated customers
Consistent with Kodak, the showing of market power,
notwithstanding the presence of competition at the
interbrand level (for example, sale of the franchise), is
likely to have great effects on trademark licensing programs
if four elements are characterized: (1) a substantial number
of licensees are substantially locked-in, (2) there is a
substantial number of unsophisticated licensees, (3)
sophisticated licensees are superfluous or effectively
protected by price discrimination, and (4) the seller enjoys
a substantial exploitative power 342 .
With respect to the first element, as stated, it is
likely that licensees support substantial investment costs
to implement their business in connection with a
trademark . Accordingly, they could be said to have, so
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long as they have not amortized or recover from their
investments, high switching costs. In the licensing context,
the issue turns to whether the licensees have, at the time
of the grant of the right to use the trademark, the
requisite information to assess the life-cycle pricing of
the business related to the exploitation of the trademark.
Unfortunately, Kodak tells us little about the degree of
lack of information needed to generate the market
imperfection from which market power may be inferred . At
least, it results from the majority ruling that the lack of
information should occur either after the tie has taken
place, or, if present at the time of the tie, its
consequences should be unreasonably unforeseeable at that
time . It is worth noting that the lock-in will probably be
less substantial where the licensee is a multi-brand
distributor than if he is an exclusive one 346 .
As for the necessity of a substantial number of
unsophisticated licensees, again, Kodak does not set a
standard between sophisticated and unsophisticated customers
for the purpose of antitrust laws. Yet, it may be considered
that licensees, who undertake to invest substantially in a
trademark-related business are cautious about their
foreseeable costs and, accordingly, should be deemed to have
researched on the overall cost of the package they buy,
provided, however, that the acquisition of the information,
though costly, was possible at the time of the commitment.
For instance, in the franchise industry, information may be
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acquired from installed franchisees . However, if the
licensor changes its pricing or marketing policy after the
commitment of its licensees, lack of information, similar to
the one found in Kodak, will more likely be characterized.
Then for the exploitation of market power to be
possible, the sophisticated buyers should be either
superfluous or effectively protected by price
discrimination . As sophisticated buyers would, prior to
the sale or the lease of the trademark, assess all the costs
related to the exploitation of the trademark, they would be
aware of the possibility of the lock-in and, accordingly,
would not get into the business. Therefore, the licensor
will not exploit its market power by raising its price if
the profit maximizing of its trademark licensing program
depends upon continuing to do business with those relatively
sophisticated licensees. Since the expertise of the
licensees is an essential criterion 349 , it may be considered,
in the first place, that trademark holders' success in their
trademark licensing programs depends on relatively
sophisticated licensees. However, even absent such
circumstance, consistent with Kodak, the licensor may still
be able to exploit its market power if he can price
discriminate between sophisticated and unsophisticated
customers. The enforcement of such a policy requires the
licensor to identify the different price sensitivities of
its licensees in order to differentiate between high and low
price licensees.
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Finally, the exploitative power of the licensor should
be substantial 350 . However, the majority in Kodak, except
rejecting the presumption that the lack of power in the
primary market did not preclude Kodak from wielding the
requisite power in the secondary market, did not tell
exactly the kind of power necessary for the ultimate finding
of an illegal tie 351 . In particular, Justice Blackmun did not
respond to the dissent's assertion that circumstantial
leverage enjoyed by Kodak did not create the requisite
market power for the purpose of antirust challenges
Accordingly, Kodak leaves open the question of the magnitude
of power to be evidenced to succeed in the showing of the
requisite market power. Are any market imperfections to be
considered and relevant for such a finding, or should the
plaintiff prove that the defendant has the ability to charge
supracompetitive prices substantially or with respect to a
substantial number of buyers. In this respect, it is
interesting to note that according to Jefferson Parish, the
vpower in abstract' that might be inferred from such market
imperfections did not suffice to trigger the per se rule 353 .
Likewise, in the franchising context, it was held that
abstract power as explained in Jefferson Parish "makes it
clear that by its requirement of market power it means
significant market power—more that the mere ability to raise
price slightly, or only on occasion, or only to a few of
seller's many customers" 354 .
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As for commentators, while many of them criticize the
lack of indication of a threshold of market imperfections
that demonstrates the requisite market power , some have
suggested that while assessing the ability to charge
supracompetitive prices in a substantial way, such
exploitation should be measured "against the package price
of the whole for that it is what the customer is
purchasing" 35 ' . For instance, in the franchising industry,
some commentators have suggested that the exploitation of
market power as described in Kodak was far for being
probable for two reasons 357 . First, it the franchisor raises
the price of unique complementary items, the franchisees
will accordingly raise their retail prices. Or, in a
presumably competitive market at the interbrand level of the
franchisees' business (for example fast food), this increase
will result in a loss of profits from the franchise caused
by the retail consumers buying from other sources.
Consequently, this policy would cause the franchisor to
suffer from reduced income from royalties. Second, if the
franchisees do not raise their retail prices, but instead
absorb the higher costs, they will suffer a loss of profits
caused by reduced margins. Similarly, this situation would
affect the primary market of the sale of franchise as this
market is competitive—there is thousands of franchise
opportunities available for prospective investors—and
information is widely available on the attractiveness on a
given franchise 358 . Accordingly, in some circumstances, the
69
Kodak defense that competition in the primary may preclude
the exploitation of market power in the secondary market may
well serve in favor of the franchisors.
It results from the foregoing analysis of the potential
impact of the Kodak case on the regulation of tie-ins in the
trademark licensing context that, no matter the weight,
which will be given to the decision, it is certain that it
will affect the drafting of trademark licensing programs in
the sense that it reinforces the assertion that current
tying law is not clear enough to enable practitioners to
efficiently foresee potential tying antitrust challenges.
Uncertainties as to the future interpretation of the Kodak
decision in connection with trademark licensing are three-
folds .
First, if broadly applied, Kodak could induce lower
courts to consider that trademarked and other differentiated
goods may constitute distinct markets 359 . This approach would
certainly have severe impact on the law of tying present in
trademark licensing as it would ease the finding of two
separate markets and, market power.
Second, if construed more narrowly, Kodak could be
interpreted as to endorse narrow markets only in limited
circumstances where a combination of market imperfections
and restrictive practices such as supracompetitive prices
and price discrimination preclude that competition in the
trademark licensing market arbitrages the licensor's conduct
in the complementary aftermarkets . In this respect, and as
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stated above, because of the relatively sophistication of
licensees, the Kodak defense may well serve in favor of the
licensors as against claims raised by licensees or
360competitors
Third, in any event and, even if reduced to a
procedural decision, Kodak is very likely to generate
increased tying antitrust suits for two reasons. On the one
hand, because Kodak gave great weight to the harm suffered
by the consumers, and the practical economic explanations
sustained by the plaintiffs, it is likely to give an
incentive to unsatisfied licensees to bring an antitrust
tying action for broader disputes grounded rather on
deception or commercial matters than on pure competition
This potential judicial threat on the contractual
relationship entered into between the licensor and the
licensee is not profitable to stable and efficient
enforcement of trademark licensing programs. On the other
hand, the hardening of the test for the grant for summary
judgment is potentially very prejudicial to licensors. If
the licensor fails to convince the Court that the facts-
based arguments of the plaintiff are unreasonable, then the
latter will be entitled to a trial, which will be more
costly, time consuming, and even less predictable when the
assessment of complex legal standards are left to the
interpretation of a jury 362 .
Accordingly, whether Kodak has narrow procedural
implications on antirust law, or modifies the substantive
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standards for prosecuting tying arrangements, there is no
doubt that it did not clarify the current tying law 363 .
Instead, it amplified the unpredictability of the outcome of
potentially increased antitrust tying challenges to
trademark licensing programs. The task for drafters is now
to determine patterns in order to limit antitrust exposures
while setting up trademark licensing programs. While
substantive law, as it stands, is unlikely to provide the
required predictability, the solution may lie in the
procedural treatment of tying arrangements, which, likewise
the European notification procedure, could consist in a
prior-enforcement clearance of the framework trademark
licensing agreement by the governmental authorities.
VLooking for a solution to establish patterns as to the validity of tying
clauses in trademark licensing: exemption procedure
Whereas no satisfactory solution may be found in
substantive antitrust laws, the analysis of the European
exemption procedure gives an interesting example of
efficient balancing between the preservation of free
competition and the interests of business people, who need
legal security. If transposable to American antitrust laws,
the exemption procedure could effectively provides
practitioners with the necessary legal certainty as to the
validity of the agreements.
A NO SATISFACTORY SOLUTION FOUND IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The literature as well as the dissenting case law have
proposed two solutions to avoid as much as possible
antitrust tying challenges in order to facilitate the
drafting of medium to long term agreements such as trademark
licensing contracts.
First, some commentators have suggested that, before
setting up a licensing program, the licensor should analyze
the markets conditions relating to the trademark and related
business in order to eliminate, within the agreement and the
7?
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according relationship with the licensee, at least one
element necessary for a finding of an illegal tie 364 . In this
respect five approaches may be taken.
Finding of an illegal tie requires as a perquisite
condition the characterization of two distinct product
markets 365 . Accordingly, the licensor should carry out a
study to analyze the character of the demand for the
trademark and the second item it intends to tie to. If the
survey reveals that there is no separate demand for the
complementary element, then normally there should be no
antitrust tying risk. However, following Kodak, and as
^ fc> f\
stated , there remains an open question as to whether any
trademarked or differentiated goods could define a relevant
product market. Therefore, the licensor should assess
whether some conditions present in the market considered
could generate a lock-in for licensees, hence, possibly
leading to the consideration that two separate product
markets actually exist. If so, the licensor should then
eliminate another element.
The easiest way to avoid a finding of an illegal tie is
to refrain from conditioning the license of the trademark
upon the purchase of an other item from the licensor or
sources that it controls, or provided that the licensee
undertakes not to take the second item from other
suppliers . In this respect, the licensor should bear in
5 C Q
mind that conditioning may be express or implied
Moreover, according to some lower courts, conditioning may
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be inferred from market power identified in the market for
the trademark 369 .
As far as possession of market power in the tying
market is concerned, if generally evidenced from the market
share or the uniqueness of the trademark 370 , following Kodak,
the licensor should also check that the specificity of the
markets involved are not subject to the kind of
imperfections, which could lead a Court to consider that
those imperfections generate the requisite market power.
However, as stated 371 , the Kodak defense may well serve the
interests of the licensor as though the presence of
substantial switching costs in the trademark licensing
business, licensees should be considered as sophisticated
buyers. To reinforce this assertion, it would be wise,
however, for the licensor, to highlight the information the
licensees were provided with, allowing them to make a
knowledgeable commitment.
If there is no certainty that none of the above element
is missing, then the licensor may decide to take the risk of
an antitrust claim of tying when only a de minimus amount of
interstate commerce in the tied item market is impacted by
the package 7 .
Another alternative for limiting antitrust tying
exposure is, for the licensor, to accomplish the objective,
i.e. goodwill protection, by another means. The most common
means in this respect is to require licensees to purchase
the complementary items from sources approved by the
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licensor, where the latter does not have any stake . These
kind of clauses have been considered not to be unlawful 374 .
Though the foregoing tips to avoid antitrust tying
challenges seem attractive when it is certain that the
licensor' s agreement runs apart from one of the tying
element, practically, it is seldom the case. In particular,
because of the importance given to markets realities in
current tying law, increased unpredictability does not
permit drafters to forecast the bordering line between
legality and illegality for all elements characterizing an
unlawful tie.
Second, and more fundamentally, increasing judges ' and
commentators 31 urge for the analysis of tying arrangements
under the rule of reason. Endorsing such proposed solution
would clearly do much for drafters as the test for an
illegal tie would be harder because of the important
consideration given to the economic benefits of the tie,
which could balance its anticompetitive effects.
Accordingly, the threat of antitrust tying challenges to
trademark licensing would be soften because of the
importance given to economic benefits such as entry into
business or goodwill protection.
However, again, trademark licensing agreements, of
which, supposedly, the benefits would, in the first place,
outweigh their anticompetitive effects, would still be
subject to judicial review. Or, courts assess the lawfulness
of a conduct at bar under tying law in force at the time it
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is submitted to it, and under current market realities.
Therefore, an agreement embodying an alleged tying clause is
subject, not only to the evolution of market realities,
which may reasonably be foreseeable for the drafters, but
more importantly to the possible overruling by the Supreme
Court of its precedent legal standards, on which the
licensor relied upon at the time of the drafting. An obvious
example of such legal uncertainty is the differing opinion
of the Supreme Court in its two latest antitrust tying
cases. Whereas in Jefferson Parish, the majority held that
market imperfections could not generate the kind of market
power necessary for a finding of a per se illegal tie
,
eight years later, the same Court concluded to the opposite
proposition that markets imperfections such as information
and switching costs could induce the requisite market power
for the purpose of tying law 378 .
It results from the foregoing, that proposed solutions
in connection with substantive tying law are not
satisfactory for drafters of medium to long term large scale
contractual programs such as trademark licensing is. As
substantive law is unable to provide business people with
the legal stability and predictability necessary to
implement efficient and stable programs, one may question
whether the solution to such a failure could not be found in
procedural antitrust law.
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B The adequate solution may lie in procedural law: the example of the
European exemption procedure
When crossing the borders to Europe, the analysis of
the exemption procedure set out by the Rome treaty
establishing the European Community gives an interesting
example of balancing between the concern of ensuring free
competition within the European market, and the need for
business people of legal security in order to compete
efficiently.
Article 85(1) of the Rome treaty, the European
counterpart of the Section 1 of the Sherman Act, prohibits,
as incompatible with the Common market, agreements that have
the object or the effect of restricting competition within
the Common Market and which affect trade between member
states 379 . In particular, article 85(1) (e) states that to
"make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations which by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts" is
prohibited. Accordingly, tying arrangements may fall within
that category of prohibited contracts. Pursuant to section 2
of article 85, agreements violative of article 85 (1) are
null and void without prior administrative or judicial
intervention. If the violative clauses of the agreement
concerned are severable, the remaining aspects remain
valid 380 .
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However, violative clauses or agreements may be
validated due to their economic benefits. Article 85(3)
provides that the prohibition of article 85(1) may be
declared inapplicable to any agreement "which contributes to
improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which
does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment
of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question" 381 .
To implement the above article, the European Council
has set out a specific procedure for obtaining an
exemption 38 ''. In accordance with this procedure, when
drafters are doubtful about the legality of a given
agreement under article 85(1), they may notify the said
agreement to the Commission. Further to the examination of
the agreement under both paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 85,
the Commission has three solutions. First, it considers that
the agreement at issue does not fall within the violation of
article 85(1) and issue a negative clearance J . Second,
though it considers that the agreement falls within the
violation, it may decide, after balancing the pros and cons
of the agreement, in particular in connection with the
economic benefit of the latter, to grant the parties with an
individual exemption 384 . An individual exemption is a formal
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decision, which may be challenged. However, once it is
final, it provides the parties with the security that their
agreement will not be challenged during the period set out
in the agreement or fixed by the Commission, and provided
that the parties strictly comply with the terms of the
agreement and/or with the conditions imposed by the
Commission. This procedure thus provides business people
with legal security. Third, the commission may refuse to
grant an individual exemption, considering that the
agreement or relevant clause is too restrictive of
competition. To further enhance legal security and business
efficiency, and because it takes about eighteen months for
the Commission to grant an individual exemption 385 , the
European Commission has issued block exemptions for some
types of agreements, such as know-how licensing or
franchising 380 .
These regulations are very useful tools for business
people in two respects. On the one hand, they are
efficiency-driven in that they provide drafters with a quick
exemption with no administrative or judicial intervention,
provided that the particular agreement falls within its
scope and strictly comply with its provisions. On the other
hand, they guide business people on the very drafting of
their agreement. Each regulation contains three kinds of
provisions, depending on the potential adverse impact of
some clauses on competition, the white clauses set out in
the regulation are those which are always valid. The grey
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clauses are those which, depending on the circumstances
(market conditions, competitive position of the parties,
etc.), may be valid or not. Finally, the black clauses are
those that are always invalid because of their proven
adverse effect on competition. An agreement, which complies
with all the provisions of a block exemption's regulation is
valid for the duration of the said regulation. It is worth
noting that if the parties are not certain that they
strictly comply with a given block exemption regulation, or
if they are willing to be certain that their agreement will
not be endangered by a potential antitrust challenge, they
may still apply for an individual exemption.
As far as trademark licensing agreements are concerned,
there does not exist any trademark license exemption
regulation per se 387 . Accordingly, when seeking for an
exemption, drafters must first notify their prospective
trademark licensing agreement to the European Commission in
order to be granted an individual exemption. In the
franchising context, the European Commission has issued a
block exemption regulation, which entered into force on
February 1, 1989, and will be effective until December 31,
1999 . In accordance with the regulation, qualify for the
exemption the agreement whereby the franchisor gives in
exchange for direct or indirect financial consideration, the
right to exploit a franchise for the purposes of marketing
specified types of goods and/or services. The agreement must
also include the right to use a common name or shop signs,
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i.e. the license of the franchisor's trademark, the
communication by the franchisor of the know-how and
technical assistance 389 . Article 3 of the regulation , which
provides for the grey clauses, lists restrictions which may
be included in the franchise agreement, provided that they
are necessary to protect the franchisor's trademark and
reputation of the franchise system391 .
Among those clause lie the clauses whereby the
franchisees may be required to use only goods manufactured
by the franchisor, provided however that, objective quality
specifications are impractical 392 . It is interesting to note
that the Commission has considered that such tying clauses
as a restriction of the license to those plants that are
capable of guaranteeing the quality of the products, or an
obligation to buy secret raw materials from the licensor to
ensure harmonized quality between the licensee and the
licensor to be valid 39\ Accordingly, under EC law, licensors
are given the possibility not only to secure their agreement
through block exemption regulations or the application for
an individual exemption, but the potential anticompetitive
effect of their agreement is affirmatively weighted against
the economic benefits, where the goodwill protection plays
an important role. It results from the foregoing analysis of
the European exemption procedure that though not perfect, it
provides trademark licensing drafters with appreciable
guidance and increased legal security on the validity of the
agreements 4 . Because this criterion is of crucial
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importance to the successful implementation of many
businesses, including trademark licensing, one may question
whether a similar procedure could be transferable to
American antitrust law.
C Possible establishment of an exemption procedure in American
ANTITRUST LAW FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM AGREEMENTS
To answer as to whether an exemption procedure similar
to the one established by article 85(3) of the Rome treaty 39
and Regulation 17/62 of the European Commission 396 , one has
to determine first, how the federal antitrust authorities
could provide drafters with more precise and practical
guidance as to the legal standards for prosecution, and
second, how a pre-implementation procedure could be set up
for medium to long term agreements. As they stand, the
federal antitrust authorities do not provide sufficient
practical guidance to drafters of trademark licensing
programs 397 . The 95 IP Licensing Guidelines are difficult to
implement because of the broadness of the definition of some
notions such as market power assessment, which is of crucial
relevance to tying challenges in trademark licensing 98 .
Furthermore, and more importantly, they do not establish
practical patterns as to the validity or invalidity of
clauses commonly present in IP licensing programs 399 .
As suggested by some practitioners, the antitrust
division of the Department of Justice, instead of setting
abstract standards for prosecution , should establish lists
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of white, grey and black clauses similar to those
established by the European Commission while issuing its
block exemptions decisions . However, in order for such
lists to effectively immunize some business practices from
challenge under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the federal
antitrust division's authority should be increased. Even if
the antitrust division was to issue practical guidance as to
the validity of clauses present in IP licensing agreements,
such guidance would be of support insofar as the agreement
would come to be challenged by the Federal authorities only.
As of today, antitrust guidelines are not binding upon
the judiciary. Or, the analysis of the case law relating to
antitrust tying challenges to trademark licensing shows that
many suits are initiated by private parties 402 . Accordingly,
issuance of practical guidance embodied into lists of white,
grey or black clauses would be of limited help without the
establishment of a real governmental review procedure,
which, once final, would be binding upon the judiciary,
hence effectively immunizing the agreement at bar from
antitrust challenge, including grounded on tying. For such a
procedure to be implemented two major modifications should
be made to current antitrust law. First, tying arrangements
should be analyzed under a rule of reason approach, whereby
the economic benefits of the arrangement would be
affirmatively balanced with its potential anticompetitive
effects. Second, and to cop with the legal insecurity, the
antitrust division would be given the authority, upon
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notification of the agreement by the parties, to immunize
the agreement from antitrust challenge for a delimited time
period. To further enhance this security and in view of the
business people's need for rapidity, the antitrust division
could also for types of agreements it has experience with,
issue block exemptions.
conclusion: call for congressional intervention
Trademark licensing-based businesses play an important
role in today's American economy. To further enhance their
competitive position, in particular in transnational trade,
business people need, as a precondition, their programs to
be secure on a legal challenge prospective. Or, as they
stand, substantive antitrust laws, and notably tying law,
provide practitioners with no clear answer or at least
methodology on how to build fully legal agreements. To
suppress, or substantially reduce this uncertainty, and in
view of the European competition law, American antitrust
laws could be amended in two respects. First, as a
perquisite, the per se treatment of tying arrangements
should be abandoned for a rule of reason analysis where, the
courts could take full consideration of the potential
economic benefits deriving from the implementation of the
said agreements. For such an overruling of the law of tie-
ins to be clear, the intervention of Congress is thus
necessary. As the courts, including the Supreme Court, have
interpreted Congressional intention as to that tying should
be treated as per se unlawful, only an intervention of
Congress expressing its intention that tie-ins be analyzed
under the rule of reason can make such overruling clear to
Cs
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interpreters 403 . Second, there should be established an
exemption procedure, similar in its effects to the European
one, whereby upon notification of their agreements to the
antitrust division, business people would be immunized from
antitrust challenge. Such an improvement toward legal
security would be highly beneficial to American business
people competitiveness in international trade as it would
put them on an equal scale with their European counterparts,
notably in view of the implementation of the uniform
European currency, which is likely to boost European
economy
.
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benefit of good reputation which excellence creates").
54
Northern Pac. Ry. V. United States, 356 U.S. 1,4-5 (1958)("the Sherman Act was designed to be a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule
of trade. It rests on the premise that unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress. While at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic, politic and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition".), see also Philip Areeda, Donald F. Turner. I
Antitrust Law. An Analysis of Antitrust Princples and their Application 7. Objectives of
Antitrust Laws; Terry Calvani, What is the Objective ofAntitrust?, in Economic Analsysis and
Antitrust Law 7 (2d ed. 1 988).
97
>5
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)("Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the
freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle
he can muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector
of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote
greater competition in a more important sector of the economy."). Id. at 610. See also James F. Ponsoldt,
The Enrichment ofSellers as an Instificationfor Vertical Restraints: A Response to Chicago 's Swiftian
Modest Proposal. 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1 166 (November, 1987)("The primary goal of antitrust [...] is to
maintain a competitive process—rivalry—as a market regulator to eliminate the inefficient or non-
innovative and to protect economic opportunity for all."). This objective of antitrust laws is often referred
to as a "populist" motive.
'6 Donald I. Baker, Vertical Pricing, Territorial, and Customer Restraints: The Searchfor Clarity (or at
least Sanity), 876 Pli/Corp9 (January, 1995)("The 'economic efficiency" theme is clearly dominant today
- in both the federal government enforcement agencies and the "new antitrust majority" on the Supreme
Court"). Id at 13.
>7
Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, supra n. 54 Chap. I at 7 ("The economic objective of a pro-
competitive policy is to maximize consumer economic welfare through efficiency in the use and the
allocation of scarce resources, and via progressiveness in the development of new productive techniques
and new products that put those resources to better use"). This economic efficiency goal may come into
conflict with the so-called populist goal of antitrust laws. Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, "[I]t is
competition, not competitors, which the act protects". Brown Shoe Co.. Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 344 (1962). Therefore, under this rationale, a conduct may comply with antitrust laws because of its
98
efficiency, and still arm small business. This situation is particularly relevant to the franchising context.
Donald I. Baker, supra n. 56 at 13.
58 However, unlike patent and copyright, respectively 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (1988), and 17 U.S.C.A. § 106
(1988), trademark law does not confer an exclusive right to make, use or sell specific products or services.
A trademark only grants the right to exclude others from using confusingly or attempting to the reputation
or the strength of the mark. Therefore, others can still compete in the marketplace for the same type of
goods. Car Fresher Corp. v. Auto Mftg. Corp., 438 F.Supp. 82, 86 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Seven-up
Co. v. No-Cal Corp., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
59
"Antitrust and Innovation in a High Technology Society", 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 50,128 at 48,996
(Jan. 10, 1994).
50
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
of Intellectual Property, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) J 13,132 § 2.0 (April 6, 1995)(hereinafter, the '1995
IP Licensing Guidelines'). It is worth noting the 1995 IP Licensing Guidelines expressly exclude the
treatment of trademarks. However, further they state that "the same general antitrust principles that apply
to other forms of intellectual property, apply to trademarks as well". Id § 1 .0, n. 1
.
61 1995 IP Licensing Guidelines, supra n. 60 § 2.3.
62 See supra n. 60 and accompanying text.
63
In the absence of a combination, conspiracy or monopoly, the trademark owner has no obligation to
license her property. She is free to choose or not to choose a licensee. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300 (1919). See also. Antitrust Guidelines § 2.2 (stating that market power does not impose on the
intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of the property to others.").
99
64
Sheila J. McCartney, Licensing Alternative to Limit Antitrust and Misuse Exposures: Part I, 1 No. 4J.
Proprietary Rts. 19, 19 (April 1995)("Enforcement remains an essential element of an intellectual
property owner's program to preserve and capitalize on its intellectual property").
55
In general, the fact of bringing a claim to enforce trademark rights is immune from antitrust
counterclaims under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. However, litigation deemed a "shamed" is excepted
from Noerr-Pennington immunity and may be the basis for antitrust liability. Under the Supreme Court's
rationale [Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Picture, Inc., 1 13 S.Ct. 1920 (1993)], a claim is
"sham" if (1) the claim is objectively baseless, and (2) there is an anti-competitive intent in bringing the
baseless suit. Id. at 1928. For an application to trademark cases, see e.g. Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc., v. McCall Pattern Co., 649 F.Supp. 832 (N.D. Ga. 1986)(bad faith of "sham" trademark litigation
cannot be made when prior trademark litigation was concluded successfully by the trademark holder),
ajfd, 825 F.2d 355 (11* Cir. 1987).
* Misuse is an equitable defense originally derived from the doctrine of unclean hands. Morton Salt Co.
v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
Generally, a defense of misuse does not require the defendant to prove a personal injury. But see
Central Ben. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 71 1 F. Supp. 1423 (S.D. Ohio 1989)( stating that only infingers
"directly and adversely affected by the alleged antitrust violations" have standing to assert trademark
misuse).
68 See supra n. 49 and accompanying text. See also VMG Enter v. F. Quesada & Franco, Inc.. 788
F.Supp. 648 (D.P.R. 1992)(holding that a concurrent use agreement containing a territorial trademark
division was not a misuse of the trademark on the grounds that not only was the territorial division a
recognition of pre-existing common law rights, but also that it could not preclude competition). Id. at 657-
58.
100
69
Carl Zweiss Stiflung v. V.E.B. Carl Zweiss Jena, 298 F.Supp. 1309, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified on
other grounds, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1 970), cert, denied, 403 U.S. 905 ( 1 97 1 ). See also Coca-Cola Co. v.
No-Cola Corp., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon,
Inc., 295 F.Supp. 115, 1 18(1 158?)(N.D. 111. 1969), aff'dinpart and rev 'd in part, 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.
1972).
70
Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Titan Technologies, Inc., 823 F.Supp. 1 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)(invalidating
a trademark because its protection would extend to the product's functional aspects and therefore, would
be anti-competitive). Id. at 1 144. See also Phi Delta Thetra Fraternity v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251
F.Supp. 968 (W.D.Mo. 1966)(cancellation of a trademark that was used to eliminate competition in the
market for fraternity jewelry).
71
Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493. See also Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard Johnson Co., 386 F.Supp. 330, 335
(N.D.Ga. 1974).
72
Paul Fields, Trademark/Antitrust Interface, 390 Pli/Pat627 (June-August, 1994). Section 33(b)(7) of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 15(b)(7) provides that the fact that "the mark has been or is being used
to violate the antitrust laws" is a defense in actions for infringement. However, it is unclear whether this
codified defense has the same effects as a defense of misuse or if it is only a defense to the incontestability
of a federally registered mark, which does not necessarily defeat the trademark owner's right to prevail in
an infringement action. Id. For a discussion on the matter, see Antitrust L. Dev. (3d ed. 1992) Chap.
IX. C(2).
73 Not every antitrust violation constitutes also a trademark misuse. For a discussion upon the similarities
as well as differences between antitrust misuse and violation, see Sheila J. McCartney, supra n. 64.
101
74 Though an antitrust challenge may have severe effects on the license program, absent simultaneously a
finding of misuse, it is not a defense to a contract. Sheila McCartney, supra n. 64.
75 Only the Department of Justice has authority to enforce criminal provisions of the antitrust laws
contained in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
76 Only the Federal Trade Commission has authority to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act.
7
Many states have enacted antitrust laws of their own, which are enforceable through the state Attorneys
General.
8
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988)("Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including
reasonable attorney's fee"). Though "the source of the antitrust injury requirement" lies in section 4 of the
Clayton Act [Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 109], courts' rulings with respect to
antitrust standing concerns apply to all provisions of federal antitrust laws. Valley Prod. Co.. Inc. v.
Landmark, 877 F.Supp. 1087,1091, n.9 (W.D. Teness. 1994).
Q
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 ( 1 977)(describing an antitrust injury as an
"injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be 'the type of loss that the
claimed violations... would be likely to cause'"). Id. at 489 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)). For further discussion on the matter, see Anthony E. DiResta, Bryan
G. Harrison & William M. Reid, "Antitrust Injury": The Substantive and Procedural Impact of
Brunswick, C695 Ali-ABA 21 1 (1991 ).
102
80
See for example Cal. Computer Prod. V. International Business Machines, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979)(stating that section 4 of the Clayton "confers standing to sue only upon those persons casually
injured by antitrust violations"). Id. at 732.
81
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15.
82 See for example Cal. Computer Prod. V. International Business Machines. 613 F.2d 727 (9
th
Cir.
1979)(pointing out that to have antitrust standing, the plaintiff must show "that the injury is of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent"). Id. at 732.
13 Hodges v. WSM, Inc., 26 F.3d 36 (6th Cir. 1994)(explaining the required casual linkage between the
plaintiffs injury and the antitrust violation. "If plaintiff would have suffered the same injury without
regard to the allegedly anticompetitive acts of defendants. Plaintiff has not suffered antitrust injury"). Id.
at 38. See also Datagate, Inc., v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 941 F.2d 864, 867-69 (9
th
Cir. 1991). For an
application to trademark licensing, see Valley Prod. Co. Inc., v. Landmark 877 F.Supp. 1087 (W.D.Tenn.
1994)(dismissal of an antitrust tying action on the ground that the injury alleged by the plaintiffs was not
of the kind to be addressed by antitrust laws; "the plaintiffs injury in this case was caused by the HFS's
decision to license only a limited number of manufacturers" and was not because of an illegal tie). Id. at
1093.
84
15 U.S.C.S. Congress passed the Sherman Act on July 2, 1890. It was the first antitrust Act voted in
response to the worrying growth of trusts.
85
15 U.S.C.S. § 1.
96
15 U.S.C.S. §2.
103
87
Continental TV Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), on remand, 461 F.Supp. 1046
(N.D.Cal. 1978), aff'd 694 F.2d 1 132 (9
th
Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350
(1967)( territorial divisions between competitors found per se unlawful); United States v. Topco Assoc,
405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
88
Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
89
Radiant Burners, Inc., v. People Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 ( 1961 )(improper use of
certification and collective marks found to be unlawful). See also Moore v. Boating Indust. Ass'n, 754
F.2d 698, 706 (7yh Cir. 1985).
90
Northern Pacific Ry. V. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)(land leased on the condition that the
leasee agrees to ship his commodities on the licensor's rail lines).
91
Also called a positive tying arrangement.
" Also called a negative tying arrangement.
b
Vertical relationships permit economies of scale. Ernest Gellhorn, William E. Kovacic, Antitrust
Law in a Nutshell, chap. 8 (4 T" ed. 1994).
Laurence J. White, The Revolution of Vertical Relationships: How did we getfrom there to here?, in
Economics and Antitrust Policy 103 (Robert J. Larner & James W. Mechan, Jr., ed. 1989).
95 See supra n. 93.
104
96
for the purpose of antitrust regulation, vertical agreements are opposed to horizontal agreements, where
the parties are actual or potential competitors. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596. ( 1972)("an
agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure [...] is usually termed a
'horizontal' restraint, in contradistinction to combinations of persons at different levels of the market
structure, e.g. manufacturers and distributors, which are termed 'vertical' restraints). In the context of this
two fold distinction, dual distribution system creates a special problem. Indeed, not only does the supplier
enter into marketing agreements to indirectly commercialize his articles, but he also sells them directly
and thus competes at the marketing level. For further discussion on dual distribution issues, see Michael
L. Denger, M. Sean Royall, 34,h Annual Advanced Antitrust Seminar: Distribution and Marketing, 876
Pli/Corp 121 (Jan., 1995). For the purpose of this thesis, we will assume that the trademark licensor does
not compete with his licensees.
97
See supra n. 96.
98
For example, see E. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348.
w
Ernest Gellhorm, William E. Kovacic, supra n. 93 at 341.
100
For a discussion on the focuses of tying arrangements, see infra C.
101
for example see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 ( 1984 )( manufacturer
terminating her business relationship with a distributor who refuses to abide by her high price policy).
102
For example see Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949)(independent
retail gas stations committed to sell only one brand of gasoline).
i(b
"rjjhe very essence of such contracts denies dealers opportunity to deal in the products of competing
suppliers and exclude suppliers from access to the outlet controlled by those dealers". Id. at 301
.
105
104
For example, while licensing his patent, the patentee can require that the licensee to take also his
trademark so that the patented articles will be only sold under the licensor's mark. Neil A. Smith,
Trademarks and the Antitrust Laws, 365 Pli/Pat685 (June-July, 1993).
105
106
See supra n. 33 and accompanying text.
E. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
107
Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1506 (N.D.Cal. 1984), a#'tf833
F.2d 1342 (9
th
Cir. 1987), cert, denied 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
08 See supra n. 33 and accompanying text.
109
110
111
Principe v. Mc Donald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4 th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 307.
See supra n. 34 and accompanying text.
112
For a general discussion of the functions of tying arrangements, see E. Thomas Sullivan. Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and its Economic Implications § 5.02[B][1] (2d ed. 1994). See
also Keith K. Wollenberg, An Economic Analysis of Tie-ins Sales: Re-examining the Leverage Theory, 39
Stan.L.Rev. 737, 743 (Febrary, 1987).
" J The leverage theory is applicable when a competitor who has a dominant position in a market uses
such power to leverage his position into a second market thereby extending his power. Ward S. Bowman,
106
Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Theory, in Terry Calvani & John Siegfried, Economic
Analysis and Antitrust Law 245-46 (2d ed. 1988).
114 A monopoly is characterized by the ability to control supply or raise prices above costs.
115 The first decision where the Supreme Court struck down a tying arrangement in the context of
intellectual property rights is Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917)(tie of motion pictures films to the license to manufacture and sale of a patented machine). The
court based its decision on the leverage power of the patented machine, considering "that the exclusive
right granted in every patent must be limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent and
that it is not competent for the owner of the patent by notice to attached to its machine to, in effect, extend
the scope of its patented invention, or to send its machines forth into the channels of trade of the country
subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid to be imposed thereafter at the discretion of such patent
owner. The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a practice and the cost, inconvenience and annoyance
to the public which the opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it". Id. at 504. See also Carbice Corp.
of America v. American Patent Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, supplemented, 283 U.S. 420 ( 193 1 )(tie-in to a
patented good is unlawful because it might allow the patent owner to "secure a partial monopoly on the
unpatented supplies consumed in its operation'".). Id. at 32.
lib See supra n. 1 15.
117
"A tie-in always operates to raise the barriers to entry in the market of the tied good to the level of
those in the market for the tying good: the seller who would supply the one, can do so only if he can also
supply the other, since he must be able to displace the whole package which the tying seller offers.
Developing a substitute for the tying product may be very difficult, if not impossible. Thus tying tends to
spread market power into markets where it would not otherwise exist: for example, few firms are prepared
to supply machines like those of IBM, whereas many may be prepared to supply punch cards". Comments
of Carl Kysen and Donald Turner of the IBM case [International Business Machines Corp. v. United
107
States, 298 U.S. 131 (1931)] where the use of punched cards was tied to the lease of IBM machines. Cited
in Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 374 (1993).
118
Notably, Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19, 20-29
(1957); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: an Economic Perspective 171-84 (1976); Robert H.
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: a Policy at War with Itself3 72-81 (1993).
119 Ward S. Bowman, supra n. 1 18 at 246(stating that "[pjresent legal methods of treating tying contracts
are based upon a false notion of leverage. When the suggested definition of leverage is employed, analysis
reveals the need for critical revaluation of the law in this area"). See also Richard A. Posner, supra n. 1 18
at 172-73 (rejecting the application by the courts of the leverage theory to tying arrangements because of
their "failure to require any proof that a monopoly of the tied product is even a remotely plausible
consequence of the tie-in", as well as their "inability to explain why a firm with a monopoly of one
product would want to monopolize complementary products as well"). Id.
120
according to Professor Watkins, t4the sale or lease of one article upon condition that a stipulated or
number of another article or articles be bought or leased from the same concern imposes a handicap, other
things being equal, upon the distribution of the first article. .. Under freely competitive conditions,
therefore, the adoption of the policy of the tying contract would tend to hinder distribution of one product
as much as it fostered distribution of the other or 'tied' product. There could be no advantage in the
employment of such a policy...". Given this notion of 'compensating disadvantage". Ward S. Bowman
notices that this situation is applicable as well if the seller has a monopolistic position in the first product,
thus making tie-ins neutral. "[W]hat is sacrificed in the way of return from the sale or lease of the tying
product must be more than compensated by increased return from the tied product". Ward S. Bowman, Jr..
supra n. 1 18 at 246-47.
121
Proponents of the competitive benefits of tie-ins argue that since the seller/licensor usually does not
gain a dominant position in the tied product, competitors are not foreclosed. They further in stating that
108
even in the hypothesis where the tying arrangement eliminates sale opportunities for competing
manufacturers it is so because of the efficiency of the package (economies of production or
complementarity of the products). Notably, Richard A. Posner, supra n. 118, Robert H. Bork, supra n.
117.
122 Economies of production along with complementarity of the package allow the seller to provide
consumers with less expensive proficient goods. Therefore, tie-ins are often better for consumers. Richard
A. Posner, supra n. 118, Robert H. Bork, supra n. 117. For further explanation, see Keith K. Wollenberg,
supra n. 1 12 at 747-750.
123
Tie-ins may be harmful to consumers if the seller actually has a dominant position in the tied market or
if there is a lack of information. In this case the monopoly should be so treated by the law. Keith K.
Wollenberg, supra n. 1 12 at 749-50; Robert H. Bork, supra n. 1 17 at 375.
124
It is strongly believed that Northern Pacific was trying to achieve this objective in the Northern Pacific
case. Northern Pacific Ry. Corp. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)(tie of the lease of land to the
shipment of all commodities produced or manufactured on the land by the lessor whereas rates of land
leases were regulated).
125 Ward S. Bowman Jr., supra n 1 18 at 249-50; E. Thomas Sullivan & Jeffrey L. Harrison, supra n. 1 12
at 1 85; Robert H. Bork, supra n. 1 1 7 at 376-78.
126
Here, there is no leverage because tying is simply use as a means to maximize the returns from the
monopoly position the seller has with regard with the first product. The tie-in contract's purpose is to fully
exploit the monopoly position in its market, but not to transfer it in the tied item market. Besides, the
same result could have been achieved by directly varying the charge of the lease of the trademark upon the
its effective use. Ward S. Bowman Jr, supra n. 1 1 8 at 250.
109
127
Id. at 249.
128
For an example in the intellectual property license context, see International Business Machines Corp.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936)(tie of tabulating cards to the lease of IBM machines).
129
For Richard A. Posner, price discrimination is the only purpose of tie-ins which should be treated
under antitrust laws, yet in a less severe manner as tying arrangements are currently treated. Richard A.
Posner, supra n. 1 18 at 176-84.
130 See supra n. 1 1 8 and accompanying text.
131 The rate of the royalty is usually proportional to the use of the trademark by the licensee. This requires
that the licensor either rely on the licensee's accounts or actually control his production.
132
Indeed, trademark was solely viewed as an indicator of the physical origin of the products or services.
Therefore, it could not be used by others than the proprietor of the mark. Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (191 6)( stating that the function of trademarks is "[t]o identify the origin or
ownership of the goods to which it is affixed"). Id at 412. Or, "licensing meant that the mark was being
used by persons not associated with the real manufacturing source". K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108
S.Ct. 1811 (1988)(citing 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 8:13 (2d ed. 1984).
See also Robert Goldsheider, Companion to Trademark Licensing Negotiations § 1 .07[2],
Licensing Law Handbook (1994-95).
ljJ Soon, Mr. Schechter criticized the physical origin rationale to bar licensing. In his treatise he urged
that licensing be permitted in order "to keep abreast of and to serve the needs of modern business." The
Historical Foundation of the Law Relating to Trademarks 813 (1925). For a discussion upon the
early state of the law regarding trademark licensing, and leading up to its recognition subordinated to
10
adequate quality control, see Elizabeth Cutter Bannon, Revisiting "The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection: " Control Quality and Dilution-Estranged Bedfellows ?, 24 J. Marshall Law Review 65, 65-
90 (Fall, 1990).
134
15 U.S.C.A. § 1055 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990)("When a registered mark or a mark sought to be
registered, is or may be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall insure to the benefit of the
registrant or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect the validity of the mark or of its
registration, provided such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive the public"). Further, the Act
defines a related company as being "any person whose use of the mark is controlled by the owner of the
mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which the
mark is used."). 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 127.
135 See Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368 (5 th Cir. 1 977)("Courts have long
imposed upon trademark licensors a duty to oversee the quality of licensee' products. The rationale for
this requirement is that marks are treated by purchasers as an indication that the trademark owner is
associated with the product. Customers rely upon the owner's reputation when they select the trademarked
goods. If a trademark owner allows to depart from his quality standards, the public will be misled, and the
trademark will cease to have utility- as an informational device. A trademark owner who allows this occurs
loses its rights to use the mark."). Id. at 387.
'6
For examples of findings of "naked" licenses, see Tally Ho, Inc.. v. Coast Community Dist., 889 F.2d
1018, 1022, 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1 131 136 n.6 (1
1
th
Cir. 1989). See also Cartier, Inc., v. Three Sheaves
Co., 465 F.Supp. 123, 129(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
^ However, it seems that the loss of the right to the trademark is limited to the geographical area where
the lack of adequate control is proven. Sheila's Shine Prods.. Inc., v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 125-26
(5
th
Cir. 1973).
11
138 15U.S.C.A. § 1127(b).
139 Though preferable, a written agreement is not necessary. Indeed, adequate quality control can be
inferred from an oral contract in the form of constant business practices in this respect between the
licensor and his licensee. Nestle Co. v. Nash-Finch Co., 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1085 (TTAB 1987)(Despite the
lack of a specific agreement, the Board found that the licensor exercised adequate control of the goods
through "training delicatessen personnel, through controlling the purchase of the majority of raw
materials and through inspection by applicant of products sold under the DEL QUIK mark"). Id. at 1088.
140 On quality control oriented provisions, see generally Siegen D. Kane, Trademark Law: A
Practitioner's Guide 337 (2d ed. 1 99 1 ).
141 Syntex Laboratories, Inc., v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F Supp. 45, 166 U.S.P.Q. 312 (S.D.N. Y.
1970), affdon other grounds 437 F.2d 566, 169 U.S.P.Q. 1 (CA 2 1 97 1 )(despite the lack of formal
quality control procedures, Syntex supervisor's duty found fulfilled on the ground that the licensee had
manufactured the product for six years. Besides, during the negotiations, Syntex had inspected the
licensee's product and ots manufacturing and quality control procedures). See also Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac
Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 227 U.S.P.Q. 598 (CA 2 1985)(despite the absence of a written
license agreement and inspection of the final product sold by the licensee, the court held that the
abandonment of the mark SHIFT KIT was not proven on the ground that "[d]ue to his association with
Winters for over ten years and his respect for his ability and expertise, Younger felt he could rely on
Winters to maintain high standards by performing his own quality control. Younger believed that Winters
was second only to Younger himself in overall knowledge and ability in product development for this
[automobile transmission] market."). Id. at 1017-18, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 605.
14 Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F.Supp. 576 (E.D.Wis. 1963), ajfd,
330 F.2d 667 (7
th
Cir. 1964).
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143
Id. at 581, 330 F.2d 667 at 670.
144 See Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368 (5 th Cir. 1977)(the court required
"only minimal quality control"). Id. at 387. See also House of Hunan, Inc., v. Hunan Art Pavilion, 227
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